

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Nov. 21, 1972

B 15

Soviets Protest Saigon Buildup

By Jack Anderson

The Soviets have protested bitterly to Washington over the rush of military supplies to South Vietnam in anticipation of a cease-fire.

This has put the Soviets on the spot, since they gave Hanoi a guarantee of U.S. good faith. The Soviets also quietly pressured Hanoi to end the fighting. They went so far as to imply that Soviet military aid might be curtailed if the war drags on.

Strictly speaking, the U.S. has not violated any understanding. Not until the shooting stops does the proposed agreement call for a halt of military shipments (except for replacements) into South Vietnam.

In an obvious effort to strengthen President Thieu's hand before the cease-fire goes into effect, the U.S. has macy isn't exactly uncommon, swamped Saigon with supplies. The deliveries of warplanes and helicopters, in particular, has transformed the South Vietnamese Air Force into one of the worlds' largest, with a new total of 1,850 aircraft.

The Soviets have charged this violates the spirit of the truce negotiations. They point out that the North Vietnamese can't match the sudden U.S. buildup and, therefore, have been placed at a last-minute

disadvantage. This has caused Hanoi to question the Soviet guarantee of U.S. good faith.

Footnote: U.S. reconnaissance flights and electronic monitors have detected no equivalent movement of supplies from the north, into South Vietnam.

Secret Deal Informed sources claim President Nixon reached a secret understanding with Premier Chou En-lai last February that the U.S. won't pull its forces out of Europe. The Chinese are eager to have the U.S. maintain a military presence in Europe to draw Soviet forces away from the tense Chinese-Russian border. The President assured Chou there would be no American military withdrawal from Europe, although reductions are being considered. Our sources say the President's assurance can't be described as a secret agreement but, more accurately, a secret, informal understanding.

U.S. Bribery?—It has been whispered around the White House that bribery was used to overcome President Thieu's opposition to a cease-fire. There is absolutely no indication he was paid off, himself. But our sources have official knowledge that other South Vietnamese leaders were slipped money to help persuade Thieu to go along with the U.S. cease-fire agreement in Saigon.

This sort of black-bag diplomacy isn't exactly uncommon.

Our sources have heard Philip Habib, for one, tell privately how he bribed opposition leaders when he was the top political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in 1965-67. Now Ambassador in Seoul, Habib was heard to say he used to carry "a little black bag" in Saigon. "From that little black bag," he is quoted, "we bought out any opposition." While Henry Kissinger was trying to sell the cease-fire to Thieu, Habib left his post in Seoul for a rush trip to Saigon. A spokesman denies that bribery played any part in these Saigon negotiations. He would say only that Habib flew to Saigon to discuss "Vietnamese matters" with Kissinger. Habib couldn't be reached for direct comment.

MUST Musn't—An important scientist in the Manned Underseas Science and Technology Office, part of the Commerce Department, is also a principal officer of a company which furnishes MUST with midget submarines. MUST rents submersibles for undersea research. One of the half-dozen "science coordinators," who participates in the decision on whether to rent a midget sub is Dr. Robert F. Dill. He also happens to be a founder, director and major stockholder in General Oceanographics, a Newport Beach, Calif., firm. MUST's deputy di-

rector, James Miller, admitted to us that he was aware of Dill's relationship with General Oceanographics but claimed Dill "exerted no undue influence" on decisions to rent the company's subs. Dr. Dill was unavailable for comment.

Naval Sabotage—Sabotage in the fleet has become so serious that Navy security engineers are studying ways of locking on the metal plates which cover inspection holes. Sailor saboteurs have removed the plates and thrown in dirt or metal shavings to foul gear boxes and other moving parts. The damage slows or stops the ships and costs thousands to repair.

CIA Echoes—CIA agents accused of fostering the opium traffic in Southeast Asia can take consolation from a precedent set 30 years ago in the same area by the old Office of Strategic Services. In a book soon to be published, called "The OSS in World War II," author Edward Hymoff writes that OSS agents parachuted into Burma with silver coins and opium to pay anti-Japanese Kachin irregulars. "If there was any moral considerations," writes Hymoff, an ex-OSS man himself, "they were overcome by the realities of war and military operations."

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Nov. 20, 1972

B7

Investigation Can Be a Big Weapon

By Jack Anderson

For years, we have reported on the alarming trend toward government by investigation. The federal bureaucracy is crawling with investigators who, if they are to earn their salaries, must investigate someone. Today, this could be almost anyone who deals with the government or makes out a tax return.

It has become an all too frequent practice, in conflicts between private citizens and federal agencies, for the government to try to settle disputes by investigating the disputants. The power of investigation, which is supposed to be used for the good of the citizens, is often used instead to intimidate, coerce and strike back at persons who challenge the rulings or oppose the policies of government.

Government files are literally crammed with the life histories of wholly innocent citizens. These files are loaded with derogatory information—true statements, deliberate lies, idle gossip—whispered into the ears of eager government gumshoes.

The dirt these gumshoes pick up on people is swept into dossiers which are freely exchanged between federal offices. This gives an alarming number of government employees access to the raw files. If the subject happens to be a prominent person, the gossip from his files travels swiftly in titillating whispers.

The Secret Service, for example, recently wanted to know more about a famous singer. A request for information brought in a deluge of raw allegations from various government agencies.

The FBI had a full file on the singer, a black woman, although she has been accused of no crimes and isn't likely to commit any. Even the CIA submitted a confidential run-down on her sex habits, with this cautionary note:

Sex File

"Because of the sensitive nature of this information and the method by which it was procured, it is furnished for LEAD PURPOSES ONLY and should not be utilized for

any other purpose, quoted, or disseminated further without the permission of the originating office."

Having cleared its conscience, the CIA proceeded to spell out unsubstantiated charges about the singer's sex life. "A confidential source," declares the three-page memo, "advised . . . that her escapades overseas and her loose morals were said to be the talk of Paris. The source stated that subject had a lurid sex life in Paris and described her as a sadistic nymphomaniac. . . ."

The memo went on and on about her sex activities, with these added comments: "Another informant described her as having a very nasty disposition, a spoiled child, very crude, and having a vile tongue. The informant states subject was not well liked by most actors and actresses working with her. The informant states she is a very self-centered, shallow person who deliberately upstages and miscues actors working with her. . . ."

"The informant states that subject did not associate with very many Negroes and often bragged that she had very little Negro blood. The informant states that those who work with subject know from experience either to play up to her or to keep their distance to avoid subject's treachery."

A spokesman stressed, and we have confirmed, that the CIA doesn't keep files on American citizens, except for security files on its own personnel. The information about the singer turned up in another context.

This illustrates, nevertheless, how promiscuous the traffic in unproved allegations has become inside the government.

Footnote: Even the National Security Agency, which is supposed to limit its activities to deciphering foreign codes, produced material about the singer. The NSA offerings, however, were limited to texts of foreign broadcasts about her.

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Oct. 17, 1972 C15

Nixon Forces Accused of Dirty Tricks

By Jack Anderson

Men in power don't relish having their cozy relationships exposed, and their sources of money bared, and their errors and embarrassments publicized.

It is not surprising, therefore that the Nixon Administration doesn't like this column. So the President's dirty tricks department tried to play a few tricks on us.

The dirty tricks operation, otherwise known as the "Offensive Security Program of the Nixon Forces," was established chiefly to bewitch and befoul Democratic presidential candidates. It was funded out of a secret, fluctuating Republican slush fund.

The Washington Post has charged that the dirty tricks included forging phony letters to embarrass the Democrats, leaking false information to the press, tailing family members of Democratic presidential candidates and throwing campaign schedules into disarray.

The Watergate incident—breaking into Democratic Party headquarters, tapping party leaders' telephones and stealing party documents—was part of this sordid operation.

In our case, the dirty tricks were pulled by political operatives and government gumshoes alike. Their objective, apparently, was two-fold: (1) to discredit the column by

and (2) to shut off our sources.

A host of investigators participated in the project. Government agents, watching through binoculars from a nearby knoll, staked out my house. With walkie-talkies, they directed waiting government security cars to tail me wherever I went. Sources inside the Justice Department provided me with the descriptions and license numbers of the cars. So it didn't take long to locate them lurking in hiding places near my home.

McCord's Report

The President's campaign security chief, James W. McCord Jr., joined in the investigation. In an "interim report" to the White House, he accused me of "close association with the operating arm of the Democratic Party." Ironically, a Democratic Party spokesman later accused me of close association with McCord's operation after we published an embarrassing memo from party files.

Sources inside the White House, meanwhile, warned us of attempts to discredit the column. Not long afterward, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs called a press conference. We were tipped off that the bureau would challenge our story about Thailand's great opium hoax.

The Thai authorities with considerable hoop-de-doo staged a million-dollar opium

burning to dramatize how they were cooperating with the U.S. crackdown on drugs. We reported, however, that they really burned cheap fodder mixed with opium.

Nixon aides went to elaborate lengths to knock the story down. They prepared pages of refutation for the press, set up a movie of the opium burning and produced an "expert" to testify how wrong we were. Not only narcotics officials but White House and Justice Department aides were involved in the arrangements.

But thanks to our advance tip, my associate Les Whitten showed up at the press conference with a stack of secret CIA documents and detailed notes from other documents. He quoted evidence right from the government's secret files that the Thais had burned fodder instead of pure opium. An administration spokesman sheepishly admitted that Uncle Sam had paid a cool \$1 million for the ashes.

Air Force Attack

More recently, the Pentagon furnished the editors of Air Force Magazine with material for a blistering attack on us. They challenged our report about Air Force research on a laser beam that would explode the eyeballs of enemy soldiers at a distance of more than a mile. Blinded soldiers, the research noted, would be more of a burden to a fighting force than dead soldiers.

We based our story on a

copy of the actual study, which speaks more than five times of the violent effects of laser beams on eyeballs. Twice, the study cites "massive blast" effects; in another place, it tells of a "micro-explosion" in the eyes. The water fluids in the eyes, adds the study, would "rise to about 100 degrees Centigrade" — the boiling point.

Although we had a copy of the study, we also contacted two Air Force researchers at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base where the research was reviewed. They would confirm only that they had been involved in classified research on laser weapons.

Finally we located the physician-researcher, Dr. Milton Zaret, who directed the study for the Air Force. To make sure our story was absolutely accurate, we read it back to him word-for-word. He suggested a few minor technical changes, which we made.

After Air Force Magazine called our story false, we reached editors Claude Witze and John Frisbee. The attack on us was written by Witze who admitted he had never seen the study he accused us of misrepresenting. He also had never tried to reach the scientist who prepared it nor, for that matter, had he bothered to seek our side of the story.

"My understanding was that (the Pentagon version) was the whole package," said Witze. "I rely on them fairly heavily."

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

Chou's Tale Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020019-3

Rivals Exciting Fiction

Which It Might Be

'I've Told You Everything,' He Tells U.S. Newsmen in China; But Some Experts Doubtful

By WARREN H. PHILLIPS

Editorial Director of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

PEKING—Premier Chou En-lai divulged details of the Chinese government's version of the downfall and death of Lin Piao, who was Mao Tse-tung's designated successor until September of last year.

The Chinese had said earlier merely that Lin Piao was killed in a plane crash while trying to flee the country after an unsuccessful plot to assassinate Communist Party Chairman Mao and seize power. The now-detailed tale of mystery and intrigue rivals adventure fiction. Even with the freshly added details, there are some among the foreign diplomats stationed here who believe it still may be just that—fiction.

Premier Chou spelled out the Lin Piao story during a three-hour-and-40-minute meeting with a 22-man delegation from the American Society of Newspaper Editors. The meeting took place in a reception room of the Great Hall of the People and lasted until the small hours of last Sunday morning.

Reports on that part of the discussion dealing with the Lin Piao affair couldn't be transmitted until an official transcript had been prepared and the premier had checked it for accuracy.

The Official Version

Here is the official Chinese government version as told by Premier Chou:

Lin Piao launched his conspiracy because "he didn't believe that he could really succeed to the leadership," the premier said. "Last year when we criticized within the party the erroneous thinking and political line by Lin Piao, he felt he could not stay on any longer."

Why had Lin Piao's position become insecure? The premier didn't say, but foreign specialists here and outside China believe they have the explanation. The 1966-1968 Cultural Revolution had left the Communist Party and civilian government structures in disarray, following Red Guard attacks on them for elitist attitudes that caused them to lose touch with the people. The Chinese army under Lin Piao, who was defense minister, had been called in to restore order and keep the country running and had assumed enormous power in China's political, economic and social institutions.

When Premier Chou began to rebuild the party and the government bureaucracy, there undoubtedly was a struggle over how much authority over civilian institutions would remain in the hands of the army and how much would revert to party authorities. Chairman Mao threw his support to the premier, and Lin Piao's future started to become cloudy. Foreign students of the Chinese scene also believe that Lin Piao opposed the decision to seek improved relations with the U.S. As early as April 1969, Premier Chou said, "Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020019-3" port to the Ninth National Party Congress that was published in his name but that actually

had been prepared by the party's Central Committee. "Be only read it out, but his thinking ran counter to the report," the premier said. The report was entitled "United to Win Still Greater Victories." The party Central Committee had earlier rejected a draft that Lin Piao had had prepared for him by Chen Po-ta, a former secretary of Mr. Mao and a Politburo member who was a militant leader of the Cultural Revolution and has since disappeared amid denunciations.

A Plot Without Action

Seeing his path to the succession endangered, Lin Piao began plotting with "a small handful of sworn conspirators" to assassinate Mr. Mao and try to seize power, according to Premier Chou. No attempt was actually made on the party chairman's life, however. "He didn't dare to put his plot into practice because it was only the scheme of a very small handful of people," Mr. Chou continued. "It was only after Lin Piao fled that we got hold of material concerning his conspiracy."

Last September Lin Piao became "afraid that his designs had been exposed" and prepared to flee on short notice, the premier said. Although Lin Piao as defense minister had the authority to order a plane for his own use, he instead had his son, Lin Li-kuo, deputy head of the air force's operations department, arrange to have a British-made Trident aircraft secretly sent to him at Peitaiho, a seaside resort to the east of Peking.

"As soon as he secretly ordered an airplane, the move was reported because it was not in accordance with our country's normal procedures," the premier said.

When officials asked Lin Piao's wife, Yeh Chun, whether a plane had been ordered, she denied it, and this "showed he was up to something. But at that time we were not sure how big the scheme was," so all airplanes in the country were ordered grounded, the premier said. He continued: "In these circumstances, as he had a guilty conscience, he thought his plot had been exposed, so he fled in great haste by the plane moved there secretly, fearing that he might be caught if he fled too late. Actually, we did not at all think of arresting him, we only wished to know what he wanted that plane for."

The plane took off on the night of Sept. 12,

1971, with a few conspirators but without even the navigator or radio operator, who had become aware of the order that no planes were to take off. The plane headed for Outer Mongolia, where Soviet influence is strong. But "when the plane got there, it failed to spot the runway of the airport and its fuel was nearly exhausted, so it had to try a forced landing." It caught fire in the attempt, and all nine persons aboard were burned to death, the premier said.

How can the premier be sure that Lin Piao was among the nine bodies? he was asked.

"Our embassy people were accompanied to the spot by officials from the Mongolian foreign ministry, and they took photos there," he replied. "Although the bodies were burned, they were not completely destroyed, and it was still possible to identify them."

After the order grounding all aircraft, another group of conspirators took off in a helicopter and tried to flee abroad but never reached the border, the premier said. It was forced to land by Chinese aircraft and "after the forced landing, many secret documents found evidence of their plot," Premier Chou said,

Lin Piao's death and details of his alleged conspiracy have never been published in the Chinese press. In fact, denunciations of his shortcomings have never referred to him by name, but have lumped him in with another leader who fell from grace earlier. "Liu Shao-chi and other swindlers" is the code phrase, with Lin Piao represented by the latter reference.

But the premier said party and government officials were told about the plot, and later ordinary citizens were informed, presumably at meetings of their local farm, factory or neighborhood organizations. "Now the entire Chinese people know about this matter," he said. "All ordinary citizens, and even children, know about it."

Why Now?

Why did Premier Chou decide now to engage in the first public discussion of the Lin Piao affair by any Chinese leader? One can only guess. A possible explanation is that the purge of Lin Piao's suspected followers has been completed, that the Chinese people have been carefully informed and that they have taken the news calmly. In addition, China may now want the world to see that the plot wasn't widespread, that it was coped with easily, that China has nothing to hide and that the matter should cease being a source of conjecture. That would fit in with China's desire to project to the world an image of calmness, stability and respectability.

Some foreign specialists accept the Lin Piao story, others are openly skeptical, while most suspend judgment. The skeptics question whether Lin would have plotted to kill as revered a national figure as Chairman Mao or would have tried to flee to the Russians, whom he had been outspoken in denouncing in the past. They suggest that Lin Piao might have been pulled from his pinnacle of power by Chairman Mao, Premier Chou and other leaders and, when he wouldn't go quietly, done away with. Then, they speculate, a group of his close followers might have tried to flee by air, were pursued over the Mongolian frontier and shot down. All this is pure speculation, of course.

"What Puzzle?"

"About this jigsaw puzzle . . ." began one American editor, addressing Premier Chou after the tale was told.

"What puzzle?" the premier interrupted. "There is no puzzle about it. I have told you everything. It's much clearer than your Warren report on the assassination of J. F. Kennedy."

"It's a puzzle to us," the editor replied.

Later, after the premier expressed skepticism that Lee Harvey Oswald had been the sole assassin of President Kennedy, J. Edward Murray of the Detroit Free Press, president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, told him: "You just have a conspiratorial mind."

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Oct. 12, 1972 G19

Kissinger's Command Is a Hot Spot

By Jack Anderson

Every day, coded messages flood into Washington from our embassies, military commands and intelligence outposts all over the world. The most urgent telegrams are funneled into Henry Kissinger's command post in the White House. Digests of overnight intelligence reports are delivered each morning to President Nixon.

From sources with access to his intelligence flow, here are some recent highlights:

New Offensive?—Privately, Henry Kissinger is optimistic about the prospects of a cease-fire in Vietnam. Yet intercepted messages indicate that North Vietnam is preparing for a renewed offensive. Our military intelligence has found no trace, however, that Russia has replaced the tanks and artillery the North Vietnamese lost in their spring offensive. They were able last spring to sneak heavy hardware into South Vietnam virtually undetected. But the best available intelligence suggests that both Russia and China have cut back military shipments to North Vietnam. Hanoi's military preparations, therefore, may be for a limited attack upon a political target, perhaps even Saigon itself. But no one really knows whether the guns will be silenced or booming when the voters go to the polls on Nov. 7.

Soft on Thieu—Hanoi may be softening slightly on its

arch enemy, President Thieu. In the secret truce talks, North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho has emphasized that the Saigon regime must be dismantled and replaced by a tripartite government dominated by neither side. But he has indicated that Saigon can choose anyone it wishes to the new government, that neither side should have a veto over the other's appointments. The implication is that Hanoi would not object if Saigon appointed the hated Thieu as a member of the tripartite government.

Mao's Vow—China's supreme ruler, Mao Tse-tung, told visiting Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka fiercely that the Chinese would resist to the death any encroachments by Russia. A CIA report on the secret Mao-Tanaka talks quotes old Mao as saying China would sacrifice its own people to prevent Soviet domination. He cited the fate of his former heir apparent, Lin Biao, who died in a plane crash fleeing to Russia after attempting a pro-Soviet coup against Mao.

Chou's Opposition—The Central Intelligence Agency reports that Chinese Premier Chou En-lai is still encountering opposition inside Peking's ruling circle. Chou's opponents are upset over his policy of detente with the United States, Japan and the West. They contend that the detente has hurt China's credibility with revolutionary forces around the world.

Soviet Shipments—A classified State Department analysis charges that Israel's forays across her borders against the Palestinian guerrillas have given the Soviets a pretext for strengthening their foothold in Syria and Iraq. Military shipment have been sent not only to Syria and Iraq but to the Palestinian guerrillas directly. Contrary to press reports of a Soviet "airlift" to Syria, however, the airlift consisted of only four transport planes, which have ceased to make regular deliveries. But the shipments, though no more than token military aid, have had the effect of strengthening Soviet bonds with the Arab hotheads. The analysis concludes, nevertheless, that Russia wouldn't likely risk war for Syria, Iraq or any other Arab country.

African Wildman—The efforts to placate Uganda's wildman, General Idi Amin, appear to have backfired. He has ordered the Asians, who had become the backbone of Uganda's economy, out of the country. He has made impossible demands upon neighboring Tanzania. He has made and broken promises to visiting mediators. He has imposed harsh martial law upon his country, charging that Tanzania, India and even Britain are planning to invade his small country. For the sake of black African solidarity, a host of black African leaders have made pilgrimages to Uganda to placate General Amin. But

a CIA report suggests all this attention has merely enlarged his ego and made him more difficult than ever.

Castro "Uncouth"—Intelligence reports acknowledge a rise in anti-U.S. feeling throughout Latin America. But apparently Cuban Dictator Fidel Castro's attempts to exploit U.S. unpopularity for his own purposes have failed. A typical message from our defense attache in Ecuador, where Castro visited last year, describes the top Ecuadorean military brass as anti-U.S. but also anti-Castro. The message quotes them as calling Castro "uncouth" and "not the great leader that many people consider him to be."

Cuba-Panama Friendship—A secret CIA cable, reporting on a conversation with a Cuban intelligence officer known only as "Alfredo" quotes him as saying that "the Cuban government generally supports the PJG (Panama's military junta) and General Omar Torrijos, the head of Panama, but wants to find ways to encourage Torrijos to move further to the left. 'Alfredo' suggested that ... leftists in Panama form a Panama-Cuba Friendship Society, which could promote friendship with Cuba, put pressure on Torrijos from the left and possibly be used as the center for certain unspecified Cuban activities."

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

WAR RAINMAKING SUBJECT OF SUIT

U.S. Said to Violate Patent
in Indochina Project

By ANTHONY RIPLEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 — In a largely unnoticed lawsuit filed here more than three weeks ago, a manufacturer of cloud-seeding equipment charges that the United States is making rain in Indochina with a device he invented, in violation of his patent rights.

Bernard A. Power, president of the Weather Engineering Corporation of Canada Ltd. and its United States subsidiary, Weather Engineering Corporation of America, estimated that 1.9-million of the devices — explosive canisters filled with silver iodide crystals — had been produced for use in Southeast Asia.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 18 that the Defense Department had not conducted any rainmaking activities over North Vietnam.

Second Denial by Laird

On July 3, The New York Times reported secret use of cloud-seeding over North Vietnam and South Vietnam and Laos, quoting both civilian and military sources in the Government.

Then, in a news conference July 6, Mr. Laird was again asked about any seeding operations. He repeated his denial concerning military operations over North Vietnam and declined comment on the situation elsewhere.

Mr. Power said by telephone from Montreal, that the company was seeking \$95-million for "full recovery of profits" for the devices, which he said cost \$50 each.

Mr. Power said the estimate was based on the length of the monsoon seasons over Indochina and the size of the area involved, which he said he thought was the Ho Chi Minh trail network. The use covered the period from 1967 to present, he said.

Tested in Newfoundland

Mr. Power said that the three-pound explosive canister and the method of dropping it from a plane into the clouds was tested in a demonstration at Harmon Air Force Base in Newfoundland in November, 1966, with military observers from Canada and the United States on hand.

The suit contends that in December, 1966, the company officers got in touch with Walt W. Rostow, who at the time was Special Assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Mr. Rostow referred them to Col. Robert N. Ginsburgh of the Air Force, who at that time was on Mr. Rostow's staff. He is now a major general in charge of Air Force public information.

The suit alleges that Mr. Power and Dewitt S. Copp, Washington representative of the company met with Colonel Ginsburgh "and disclosed the details of a plan to close infiltration trails to South Vietnam while at the same time greatly reducing the loss of lives normally attendant with the conventional procedures of attempting to close the trails by bombing."

That plan, the suit alleges, was to make the trails impassable through excessive rainfall. At the time they described their patented devices, exhibited models and discussed both tactical and strategic use.

In the telephone interview, Mr. Power said he had had no formal contract with the Department of Defense but had been told by Colonel Ginsburgh that the United States would either get in touch with them for a supply of the devices, use them without telling the company or do nothing.

"He said we would hear nothing until the war was over," Mr. Power said.

Sought Information

In March, 1971, he said, he first heard that weather modification was being used in Southeast Asia in an article by Jack Anderson, the columnist, and decided to see if his device was involved.

Since April, 1971, the suit alleges, the company has met with the General Counsel's office of the Defense Department trying to work out the matter to no avail.

"To date," the suit alleges, "the Department of Defense has been either unable or unwilling to supply plaintiffs with any information on the procedures or structures used in the weather modification pro-

When the matter of military rainmaking came to light again this year, Mr. Power said, he was advised to file suit seeking to examine documents and question witnesses about the matter.

Device on Paperboard Tube

The device itself is a paperboard tube wrapped with explosive cord that contains silver iodide. Protruding from one end is a lanyard that is attached to a delay fuse and three blasting caps.

The lanyard is attached to the inside of an airplane and the device shoved by hand through a hole in the plane's body, jerking the lanyard out to start the time fuse. It falls into the cloud and explodes, releasing the silver iodide crystals.



Jack Anderson

Soviets, Syrians Fight Peace Bid

INTELLIGENCE reports claim that the Soviet Union's conspiring with Syria's President Hafez Assad to block Egypt's President Anwar Sadat from achieving a Middle East peace settlement.

By expelling Soviet forces from Egypt, Sadat had maneuvered into position to get some concessions from Israel. Indeed, there were signals from Tel Aviv that Israel would be generous about returning captured territory.

The Israelis made it clear, however, that they intended to keep the strategic Golan Heights which they seized from Syria. The Syrians, therefore, would have nothing to gain from a peace settlement.

Egypt and Syria are partners, with Libya, in an Arab confederation. But the Central Intelligence Agency, in secret reports from Damascus, has quoted President Assad as making derogatory remarks about the Egyptians.

Not long after the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt, the Kremlin sent an urgent, hand-carried message to Assad. The message, according to the CIA, warned that Syria couldn't afford to follow Egypt's example and strip the country of Soviet protection. This would leave Syria vulnerable to an Israeli attack, the message reportedly declared.

Not only did Assad heed the message and keep his Soviet advisers, but he agreed to bring more Soviet military equipment and technicians into the country.

The intelligence reports suggest that the Kremlin seeks to block an Egyptian-Israeli accord—because it could only be arranged by U.S. mediation. This would increase American influence in the area and leave the Soviets out in the cold.

THE SOVIET overtures to Syria, incidentally, have also has a side effect upon Syrian-American relations. Previously, the Syrians had shown signs of wishing to improve their relations with the United States.

An intelligence report tells, for example, how the Syrians in July, 1969, communicated with U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) agents in Beirut through an Italian diplomat that they would agree to a resumption of cooperation with the United States on narcotics matters.

Subsequently, according to the classified document, "two visits to Damascus by BNDD agents were conducted cordially and an exchange of information was initiated."

American diplomats from Lebanon and Jordan were also allowed to travel in Syria. But suddenly, on Sept. 1, Maj. Richard Barrett, an assistant U.S. military attache in Jordan, was arrested as he was driving through the Syrian countryside.

And David McClintock, chief of the political section at the U.S. embassy in Jordan, was manhandled by Syrian border guards when he tried to cross the border. He was turned back and had to be driven out of Syria in an Italian embassy car.

Castro's Denial

WE RECENTLY quoted Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro as saying that Chile's President Salvador Allende was "physically spent" and that other Chilean leaders "live too well."

This has brought a roaring denial from Castro, whose private opinions of Allende weren't intended for outside ears. He said that all, are supposed to be Marxist comrades.

We copied Castro's remarks verbatim from a secret intelligence cable, which gave a detailed account of his meeting with pro-Castro leaders in Chile last winter.

"During the morning of 3 December 1971," began the cable, "Fidel Castro and Armando Hart, member of the central committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, met with a very few nationals who are strong sympathizers of the Cuban revolution in the residence of the Cuban ambassador in Santiago."

As we reported earlier, "Castro said he is worried about Allende because the latter is physically spent. Castro also observed that U.P. [Allende's popular unity government] leaders live too well and are not under sufficient tension to take the offensive."

Here are some additional quotes which we didn't include in our original story:

"Castro commented that there is an ideological weakness within the U.P. coalition. The U.P., he said, does not have a good grasp of the problems which are involved in a revolutionary process . . .

"Castro stated that the Communist Party of Chile (PCC), which he called the spinal column of the Popular Unity government, was too conservative and said that it must become more radical and move to assume the role of the vanguard of the U.P."

© 1972. United Feature Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, Sept. 8, 1972

D 19

Aid Sought for Crusading Tenn. Editor

By Jack Anderson

During the early morning hours of August 23, an arsonist set ablaze the two-story offices of a Tennessee newspaper whose crusading editor, Dan Hicks Jr., had dared to print the truth about corrupt county politicians and law-breaking bootleggers.

It wasn't the first violence against Hicks since he took over the weekly Democrat in the small rural town of Madisonville, Tenn., in 1967. He has been firebombed, shot at twice and assaulted by two hired hooligans. Equipment has been stolen out of his newspaper office.

But the soft-spoken editor hasn't been intimidated. "If I have to print this newspaper elsewhere and drop it on this town from an airplane, I'll do it," he told us.

Ever since John Peter Zenger was thrown into a dungeon in 1735 for publishing a critical story about the governor of New York, editors like Dan Hicks have defied gunmen and government men alike to print the truth.

In his small corner of East Tennessee's wild-boar country, Dan Hicks is fighting for freedom of the press. This isn't a right that belongs just to editors. Rather, it is the right of every American to pick up a pen and express his grievances.

We believe Dan Hicks' fight, therefore, is every American's

fight. So let us all help him raise the \$20,000 it will cost to replace his ruined equipment. Contributions can be sent to him at P.O. Box 8, Madisonville, Tenn., 37354.

The Marxist Brothers

Cuba's Fidel Castro has been critical, in private, of Chile's Salvador Allende.

Not only has Allende failed to impose Marxism upon Chile with the necessary force and to keep the people in fear of the government, complained Castro, but Allende is "physically spent."

The leaders he has brought to power in Chile also "live too well" and "are not under sufficient tension," said Castro.

The Cuban conquistador confided what he really thought of Allende while he was Allende's guest last winter. Castro actually made some of his remarks to Allende's face but spoke more sharply behind his back.

Hard-core Communist leaders gathered for a secret session with Castro on December 3 at the home of the Cuban ambassador in Santiago. An account of the meeting was obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency, whose secret report has now been made available to us.

"Castro said the U.P. (Allende's Popular Unity government) does not have a solid front to face the opposition, which he claimed is growing rapidly," declares the CIA re-

port. "Castro added that the situation in Chile is rapidly approaching a critical stage . . .

"Among the factors listed by Castro, which could precipitate the crisis and a confrontation with the opposition, was a breakdown in public order. This, he said, could come about at any time because the opposition, especially the middle class, has lost its fear of the government.

Allende's Health

"Castro opined that a government must have fear if it is to control the country," the CIA report continues. "Another factor listed by Castro was the possible deterioration of Allende's health. Castro said he is worried about Allende because the latter is physically spent.

"Castro also observed that U.P. leaders live too well and are not under sufficient tension to take the offensive. Intertwined into the overall situation is that the U.P. has a 'minority complex,' which affects its judgment.

"In relation to the Chilean armed forces, Castro said that Allende is chasing an illusion by thinking that he can count on the Chilean military to defend his government during a critical period. He said Allende is completely mistaken in this regard.

"He classified the Chilean armed forces as anti-communist, and said that the militar-

has not yet acted against the U.P. because Allende has stayed within the constitution.

"Castro added that he had told the President all of this, but that Allende did not respond.

"Castro then complained that he thought the U.P. was not really happy with the results of his visit, despite the fact that he did everything the U.P. leaders wanted. He said he believes he helped the U.P. by his presence, but he added that many U.P. leaders are of the opinion he stayed too long and talked too much.

"Castro said he felt that his December farewell gathering had been a disaster, because all of his efforts in Chile had been directed toward getting the masses behind the U.P. However, there was no mass turnout for the farewell and some people even left the gathering before he had finished speaking."

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

'65 Reports on Outlook for War By U.S. Intelligence Community

Section of Pentagon papers dealing with reports on outlook for Communists' activities, April 22, 1965. First section is attributed to "leading personalities of the United States intelligence community." Section in italics is the Pentagon analysts' explanation, which introduces comments by Adm. William F. Raborn Jr., then Director of Central Intelligence.

If present U.S. policies continue without the introduction of large additional forces or increased U.S. air effort, the Communists are likely to hold to their existing policy of seeking victory in the local military struggle in South Vietnam. They will try to intensify that struggle, supporting it with additional men and equipment. At the same time, D.R.V. air defenses will be strengthened through Soviet and perhaps Chinese aid.

If, however, the U.S. deepens its involvement by increasing its combat role and intensifying its air effort, the intelligence officers believed:

... that the Vietcong, North Vietnam and China would initially . . . try to offset the new enemy strength by stepping up the insurgency, reinforcing the Vietcong with the men and equipment necessary. They would likely count on time being on their side and try to force the piecemeal engagement of U.S. troops under conditions which might bring them down in jungle warfare, hoping to present the U.S. with a de facto partition of the country. The Soviet Union . . . would almost certainly acquiesce in a decision by Hanoi to intensify the struggle.

This lack of any real prospect of "give" on the enemy's part was also confirmed by Admiral Raborn, shortly after he had succeeded John McCone as Director of Central Intelligence. On the day of Raborn's swearing-in (April 28), the President had given him a letter from McCone which McCone had handed to the President as his last official act. The President had asked Raborn to prepare his own comments on McCone's views. Raborn's comments, circulated to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara on May 6, included the following:

Our limited bombing of the North and our present groundforce build-up in the South are not likely to exert sufficient pressure on the enemy to cause him to meet our present terms in the foreseeable future. I note very recent evidence which suggests that our military pressures are becoming somewhat more damaging to the enemy within South Vietnam, but I am inclined to doubt that this damage is increasing

at a rate which will bring him quickly to the conference table.

With particular reference to McCone's recommendation that the U.S. add much heavier air action against the North to its planned combat force deployment to the South, Raborn indicated his agreement, and expressed his belief that such an action would have the following consequences:

The D.R.V. is, in my view, unlikely to engage in meaningful discussions at any time in coming months until U.S. air attacks have begun to damage or destroy its principal economic and military targets. I thus concur with the U.S.I.B.'s judgment of 18 February 1965, that, given such U.S. punishment, the enemy would be 'somewhat more likely' to decide to make some effort to secure a respite, rather than to intensify the struggle further and accept the consequent risks.

And then he added the following advice:

Insofar as possible, we should try to manage any program of expanded bombings in ways which (1) would leave the D.R.V. an opportunity to explore negotiations without complete loss of face, (2) would not preclude any Soviet pressures on Hanoi to keep the war from expanding, and (3) would not suddenly produce extreme world pressures against us. In this connection, the timing and circumstances in which the bombings were extended northward could be of critical importance, particularly in light of the fact that there have been some indications of differing views between Moscow, Peiping and Hanoi. For example, it would probably be advantageous to expand bombings after, not before, some major new VC move (e.g., obvious concentration for imminent attack on Da Nang or Kontum) and after, not before, any current possibilities of serious negotiations have been fully tested. And such bombings should not be so regular as to leave no interval for the Communists to make concessions with some grace. Indeed, we should keep in mind the possibility of a pause at some appropriate time, which could serve to test the Communist intentions and to exploit any differences on their side.

NEW YORK TIMES

DATE 28 JUN 72

PAGE

Secret History Affords Insights on Negotiations

By NEIL SHEEHAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 27 — The Pentagon papers volumes on the secret diplomacy of the Johnson Administration show that Hanoi and Washington could not reach a peace settlement because they could not compromise their basic disagreement over who would hold power in South Vietnam.

These four volumes of the secret history of the Indochina war reveal that Hanoi, despite mounting levels of punishment, was adamantly clinging to its long-term objective of unifying Vietnam under a Communist form of government. The history shows Washington just as adamantly clinging to its objective of leaving Vietnam permanently divided into two states and preserving a non-Communist South.

The history shows the lack of contacts between the two sides or shortage of intermediaries to carry messages back and forth, and indicates that the opportunity for peace was missed for reasons of substance, not for want of diplomatic machinery.

When The New York Times published its series of articles on the Pentagon papers last June and July, it did not possess these four volumes of the 47-volume Pentagon study. A substantial part of these diplomatic volumes has now been obtained by Jack Anderson, syndicated columnist, a copy was given to the Times at the request of the Lakeland Ledger, a Florida newspaper owned by The Times. The Ledger subscribes to Mr. Anderson's column.

Attitudes Clarified

The volumes on the negotiations begin with events in mid-1964 and end with May of 1968, shortly after President Lyndon B. Johnson made possible the opening of the Paris talks by limiting the bombing of North Vietnam to the area south of the 20th Parallel and currently announced decision not to seek another term.

The Pentagon history does not contain major revelations, but it does reveal much about the attitudes of both sides, the style of their diplomacy and why they could not reach a

settlement. Among the major points are these:

The volumes do not indicate any missed opportunities for peace.

While there may have been some misunderstanding, each side understood reasonably well what the other wanted. The problem was that neither side was willing to compromise on the basic substance of its position.

What misunderstanding did exist seems to have been more on the part of Washington which apparently could not believe that the Vietnamese Communists would adhere to their basic objective of unifying Vietnam under a Communist form of government.

Hanoi conducted relatively open diplomacy, saying virtually the same things in private as in public.

Hanoi was willing to compromise only to the extent of giving Washington a face-saving method of withdrawal from the South and of postponing the achievement of its long-term objective for a few years by the formation of a supposed non-Communist regime in the South.

When Washington spoke publicly of negotiations, it usually meant, in private, the evolution of similar face-saving means for Hanoi to halt the war in the South in exchange for an end to American bombing and ground intervention.

Hanoi did not attempt to use the peace movement in the United States as a channel for negotiations. Rather, it seems to have regarded the peace movement as evidence of a fundamental political weakness in American policy that would tell against Washington in the end.

Washington in turn tended to regard the peace movement as evidence of a fundamental political weakness in American policy that would tell against Washington in the end.

The unwillingness to compromise basic positions was evident reports on the first South and the creation of a neutral regime there in accord-



The New York Times

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, left, and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union at the Soviet mission here in 1967. When they conferred in Vienna in May, 1965, Mr. Gromyko told Mr. Rusk Soviet Union "will not negotiate about Vietnam."

June of 1964 through J. Blair Seaborn, the Canadian member of the International Control Commission for Vietnam, and in the first bombing pause, for five days in May of 1965, which was code-named Mayflower by the State Department.

On June 13, 1964, more than six months before the first air attacks on the North, Mr. Seaborn orally conveyed a message from the Johnson Administration to Premier Phan Van Dong of North Vietnam, according to the history. The message said, according to the Pentagon account, that the United States was determined to preserve a non-Communist South Vietnam and threatened North Vietnam with "the greatest devastation" if Hanoi did not halt the Vietcong guerrilla rebellion in the South and if the conflict intensified.

The Pentagon history says that Premier Dong "laughed and said he did indeed appreciate the problem." He is reported to have replied that while North Vietnam "will not provoke the U. S.," apparently through overt intervention, Hanoi would continue to support the Vietcong and "We shall win."

He is reported to have proposed as a "just solution" an American withdrawal from the South and the creation of a neutral regime there in accord-

seems to have caused, despite the constant hope of Washington that the pressure would force Hanoi to compromise its basic objective, is strikingly evident in remarks attributed to Premier Dong in conversation with two French scientists in July, 1967, when the bombing was at its height.

The two scientists, Herbert Marcovitch and Raymond Aubrac—Mr. Aubrac was a friend of the late President Ho Chi Minh—went to Hanoi as intermediaries for the Johnson Administration. Their mission was arranged and supervised by Henry A. Kissinger, then a Harvard professor and now President Nixon's adviser on national security.

U.S. Power Acknowledged

The message they carried to Hanoi was essentially the same as the earlier ones.

Premier Dong is quoted as having replied that Hanoi knew that "U.S. power is enormous and the U.S. Government wants to win the war."

"President Johnson is suffering from a pain and this pain is called South Vietnam," he went on. "Therefore we think that attacks on the North are likely to increase. We have made provisions for attacks on our dikes; we are ready to accept war on our soil. Our military potential is growing because of aid from the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries."

"Now I shall talk to you about negotiations and solutions," Premier Dong is said to have continued. "We have been fighting for our independence for 4,000 years. We have defeated the Mongols three times. The United States Army, strong as it is, is not as terrifying as Genghis Khan."

He again replied to Washington that the solution for the

United States was to withdraw from South Vietnam and permit the establishment of a neutral regime there, according to the history.

"To the extent they believed each other, the two sides were amply forewarned that a painful contest lay ahead," the Pentagon historians write in not.

They held very different estimates of the efficacy of U.S. military might. We thought its pressures could accomplish our goals. The Communists did not."

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, June 27, 1972 B 15

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

The Government Secrecy Syndrome

By Jack Anderson

The custodians of government secrets are gnashing their teeth again over our access to the still-secret portions of the Pentagon Papers. These show how Lyndon Johnson tried to bring pressure upon Hanoi to negotiate a Vietnam settlement by orchestrating the air raids against the North.

He would withhold the bombs for awhile, hoping this would encourage the North Vietnamese to negotiate. Then he would let the bombs fly again when he thought they needed some prodding.

Sometimes, he stepped up the bombing at crucial stages of the secret negotiations. Repeatedly, Hanoi would halt the talks because of the military pressure.

After his retirement, President Johnson published selective excerpts from the secret papers to demonstrate how right and reasonable he had been. He omitted the portions that made him look wrong and unreasonable.

President Nixon also released sensitive information, strictly for political reasons, about Henry Kissinger's secret Vietnam negotiations. The President used the information to reply to his critics.

The power to classify information must be recognized for what it is. It is nothing less than the absolute authority of the government to make a

state secret of whatever it wishes. This divine right to classify documents has been abused to a degree beyond tolerance.

Not only does the government sweep its bungles and blunders, its errors and embarrassments under the secrecy labels. But our entire foreign policy and defense posture remains secret except for what the federal establishment thinks is in its own interest to make public.

The tragic, bitter lessons of Vietnam have shown the fateful consequences of allowing any president to exercise power in splendid isolation behind the double walls of executive privilege and official secrecy.

We will continue, therefore, to publish information that the government seeks to hide from the public by classifying.

Soviet Role

The unpublished Pentagon Papers, for example, shed new light on the Soviet role in the Vietnam negotiations: The Kremlin, after showing no interest in settling the war, suddenly adopted a different attitude in 1967. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin made the new attitude known during a London visit.

"The British were first startled, then delighted to find Kosygin eager to play an active role as intermediary between the U.S. and Hanoi..." state the papers. "There

was definitely a sharp change from previous Soviet reluctance to play the middleman. . . .

"What produced this change in Soviet attitudes? Were they acting on DRV (North Vietnamese) behest? Or were they now willing to put pressure on Hanoi in pursuit of their own?"

"Only a little light is shed on these questions by the materials relating to Kosygin's stay in London. He was apparently willing to transmit proposals for DRV consideration more or less uncritically. While he argued the general merits of the DRV's side of the war, he did not try to bargain or alter specifics of the proposals transmitted to him. . . .

"What is more striking is that he did not react adversely to the substance of the principal de-escalatory proposal under discussion—the termination of all DRV infiltration and supply into SVN in exchange for a U.S. halt in attacks on the North and in troop level augmentation.

Intercepted Call

"Entirely apart from the sequence in which these steps would be taken, their long-term result for the Communists would be extremely adverse militarily. Yet on Feb. 13, he was overheard (by telephone intercept) to tell Brezhnev (the Communist Party

chief) of 'a great possibility of achieving the aim, if the Vietnamese will understand the present situation that we have passed to them; and they will have to decide. . . .'

"In a retrospective discussion with Thompson (then the U.S. Ambassador) in Moscow, Kosygin expressed a jaundiced view of the rule of mediators, saying they either complicated the problem or pretended they were doing something when in fact they were not.

"He had stepped into this uncomfortable spot in London because the Vietnamese had for the first time stated they were ready to negotiate if the bombings were stopped unconditionally; this was the first time they had done so. . . .

"How much the Russians had hoped in fact to accomplish during Kosygin's London trip is impossible to know. They apparently harbored few expectations after his return. Kosygin complained to Thompson about the 'ultimatum' implied in the final proposal he transmitted to Hanoi from London, saying that he knew it was hopeless the minute he read it. . . ."

This incident illustrates how little influence the Kremlin had over the North Vietnamese. It was the beginning, however, of an increased Soviet interest in ending the Vietnam War.

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020019-3
 THE WASHINGTON POST

B11

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, June 26, 1972 B 11

3 Hanoi Lessons Still Unlearned

By Jack Anderson

The history of our secret negotiations with Hanoi contains some painful lessons, which still seem to be disregarded in the quest for a Vietnam peace.

The agonizing details appear in the unpublished portions of the Pentagon Papers, which Daniel Ellsberg carefully withheld from the press.

President Nixon, however, has made public even more sensitive negotiations than are described in the suppressed papers. The Justice Department is also preparing to use these papers in its prosecution of Ellsberg. There appears to be no legitimate reason, therefore, for continuing the secrecy.

We have a copy of the unpublished Pentagon Papers, which give chronological account of our diplomatic frustrations in seeking an end to the Vietnam War. Here are the lessons, which seemed to us to be the most compelling:

Lesson No. 1—Ex-President Lyndon Johnson orchestrated the bombing of North Vietnam in careful synchronization

with the peace negotiations. He alternately suspended and escalated the bombing in an effort to influence the negotiations. Invariably, this seemed to produce the opposite effect in Hanoi than Mr. Johnson had intended. Yet President Nixon is now using the same strategy.

Lesson No. 2—The North Vietnamese, whether on the battlefield or at the peace table, never lost sight of their ultimate goal: control of all Vietnam. As the unpublished papers put it, "Who shall govern SVN is what the war is all about."

Lesson No. 3—With a patience unknown in the West, the Hanoi leaders are prepared to outwait and outlast all enemies. "We have been fighting for our independence for 4,000 years," Premier Pham Von Dong told intermediaries who approached him in 1967 with a peace offer. "We have defeated the Mongols three times. The United States Army, strong as it is, is not as terrifying as Genghis Khan."

Lyndon Johnson's game of now-we-bomb-now-we-don't, ac-

cording to the peace papers, repeatedly backfired.

An exchange of peace messages through the Poles, for example, ended abruptly with the bombing of Hanoi on Dec. 13-14, 1966. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin later reviewed with Secretary of State Dean Rusk why the contact had been broken off. "The bombing was just before that date," Dobrynin explained Hanoi's response, "meaning the U.S. thought it could pressure Hanoi to talk."

The papers quote a Soviet diplomat as saying the North Vietnamese regarded bombing of their homeland as an effort "to get Hanoi to talk." The refusal to talk while the bombs were dropping, he said, "was a direct response" to the U.S. position.

Nevertheless, President Nixon has now stepped up the bombing again as a means of wringing concessions out of the Hanoi leadership. But he, too, is finding the North Vietnamese fiercely stubborn. Their attitude is expressed in a secret quotation from Premier Pham Van Dong.

"President Johnson is suffering from a pain, and this pain is called South Vietnam," the North Vietnamese Premier told peace emissaries in 1967. "We agree that the situation on the battlefield is decisive; the game is being played in South Vietnam."

"From the newspapers we see that some people want to confine the war to the South. However, the White House and the Pentagon seem determined to continue the war against the North. Therefore, we think that attacks on the North are likely to increase."

"We have made provisions for attacks on our dikes; we are ready to accept war on our soil. Our military potential is growing because of aid from the USSR and other Socialist countries...."

"We fight only when we choose; we economize on our resources; we fight only for political purposes...."

The lessons outlined in the unpublished Pentagon Papers should be studied carefully by those who still are seeking peace in Vietnam.

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

U.S. Attempted to Ignite Vietnam Forests in '66-67

By ROBERT REINHOLD

Special to The New York Times

MISSOULA, Montana, July 16—Well-informed civilian and military sources have disclosed that in an effort to clear away enemy-controlled forests, the United States made a number of concerted attempts to set huge fire storms in Vietnam during 1966 and 1967. The project was ultimately abandoned, they said, because the moist tropical rain forest would not burn.

The project was undertaken with the collaboration of fire-prevention experts from the United States Forest Service. They were detached from the service's Northern Forest Fire Laboratory in Missoula and, according to some reports, from the Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station in California.

Area Is Defoliated

In the final attempt, called Operation Pink Rose, an area about the size of the city of Philadelphia was defoliated and bombarded with magnesium incendiary bombs in Iron triangle region northwest of Saigon, an area where the Allied pacification program had never succeeded in eradicating Vietcong influence. An earlier attempt aimed at a wooded area nearer Saigon was dubbed Operation Sherwood Forest. The results of the two attempts was so disappointing that no further efforts were made.

"It produced a lot of smoke and not a whole heck of a lot of fire at all," said a Pentagon spokesman, who confirmed that the fire attempts took place under the Johnson Administration. He called them "test projects aimed at determining the feasibility of jungle-clearing by burning," and added

Continued on Page 2, Column 2

Continued From Page 1, Col. 2

that he could not provide further details of the project, which was conducted by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, a high-level research arm of the Defense Department.

Concern Over Environment

The disclosure comes at a time of mounting concern among some scientists and Government officials that years of defoliation, bombing and burning have inflicted irreversible damage on the Vietnamese environment. Only recently was it disclosed that the United States has been seeding clouds over Indochina.

The target of the fire storm efforts were rare and desirable mahogany trees that many forestry experts consider a potentially valuable resource for the Vietnamese economy.

Had the burning succeeded, according to interviews with a number of experts on tropical vegetation, the trees would probably have been destroyed, replaced possibly by less useful bamboo and other coarse vegetation.

One military officer familiar with the project defended it on strategic grounds. Saying that the areas—War Zones C and D in Tay Ninh and Long Khanh Provinces—were Vietcong staging areas, he asked, "When you're fighting a war, do you want to save trees or lives?"

At the same time that the American foresters were trying to set forest fires, other United States Forest Service specialists were at work helping to build Vietnam's primitive logging industry and to improve timber management techniques, under contract with the Agency for International Development.

Sought to Try Again

Although the fire storm project failed, it is understood from reliable sources that military officials suggested that it be tried again if better methods could be devised. They also suggested that forest and other areas of the world be surveyed to determine if fire

storms could be employed as a weapon.

Interviews with fire experts suggest that the project was ill-fated from the outset. "No way—too wet," remarked William R. Beaufait, a Forest Service expert in the setting of prescribed fires to control timber forests, in his office here.

Fire storms are a fearsome and little understood phenomenon. A fire storm, unlike an ordinary conflagration, packs tremendous energy. It sucks in air from all around, creating a convection column and mighty whirlwinds. What results resembles a cyclone and it is capable of ripping out bridges and 300-foot trees like matchsticks. Its demand for oxygen is such that people in the area perish from asphyxiation: this occurred during the Allies' World War II bombings of Dresden and Hamburg, in which more than 200,000 died.

Although the methods of starting and controlling fire storms are not well understood, the foresters were asked to advise the military on the best conditions—in terms of season, wind, rainfall, temperature, moisture content of vegetation and other factors. Civilians in Vietnam during the period from 1965 to 1967 report having seen Forest Service personnel at the Advanced Projects Research Agency compound in Saigon.

White House Role Unclear

It could not be learned if the project had the approval of President Johnson, but according to a former high-ranking military officer, "The procedure was to get clearance from the White House on anything like this."

A forestry contingent, working under contract to the research agency, was believed to include Craig Chandler, now in Washington as director of forest-fire research for the Forest Service, and Robert W. Mutch, a scientist at the fire laboratory here who has studied the mechanisms of fire spreading and the relationship of woodland fires to ecological systems.

Mr. Chandler was formerly with the Pacific Southwest station in Berkeley, Calif., which

participated in fire storm experiments in the early nineteen-sixties. He acknowledged that he had been to Vietnam, but referred questions about his functions there to the Pentagon.

A document that is still secret is believed to contain the details of some of the early work by the foresters. It is titled "Forest Fire Research—Final Report, Phase I, Volume 1, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service. ARPA Order, Number 818. January, 1966."

The burning was necessarily keyed to the dry season in South Vietnam which lasts roughly from January to April. The target was what botanists call a double-canopied tropical rain forest. Double-canopied means that there are two levels of vegetation, the upper being the tops of tall mahogany trees, called Dipterocarpus, and the lower being smaller bushes and trees. Such a cover provides effective concealment for troops, but the area is not otherwise inhabited.

Spraying With Herbicides

Although the forest is wet even in the dry season, the foresters theorized that they could create enough fuel for burning by first killing the leaves by spraying with chemical herbicides. This task was carried out by Operation Ranch Hand, the 9th Air Force code name for the defoliation operations. The incendiaries were dropped by other Air Force planes.

The burning project was described by a former commander of Ranch Hand, Lieut. Col. Arthur F. McConnell Jr., in an article he wrote in 1970 for the Air University Review. The article was heavily censored, but an uncut draft has been obtained by The New York Times.

According to Colonel McConnell, the first burning, Operation Sherwood Forest, was tried early in 1965. He described it as "a massive attempt to burn out a defoliated section of the Boiloi Woods in the hopes of denying the enemy an extremely vital base camp area."

"For the next year," Colonel McConnell continued, "several

fire storm projects similar to the Boiloi Woods effort were made in conjunction with the Vietnamese Air Force. While the attempts to ignite the defoliated area met with limited success, the effect of the defoliant itself significantly improved visibility for observation."

Flew 225 Sorties

In support of the final fire storm effort in April, 1967, he wrote, his squadron flew "approximately 225 sorties and delivered over a quarter-million gallons of herbicides on selected target areas in War Zones C and D."

According to other sources, the undergrowth was ignited, but the fire did not spread to the 70-foot high upper canopy. Since this third and final attempt was carried out under the most favorable conditions, the project was abandoned as unfeasible.

A Visit to a Secret American Base in Thailand

By Peter Smith

Pacific News Service

PHITSANULOK, Thailand—In a U-shaped bend of a small river about 15 miles east of this northern district capital lies a secret U.S. military training base known as Camp Saritsana.

Near the point where I had been told to turn off the road to find the camp, a Thai waitress in a small restaurant said that there were usually about 1,000 Thai soldiers at the site, but that most had just left. She also told me that 10 or 15 Americans were stationed there, and that planes landed on an average of five times a day.

As I walked along the river away from the high-

way, the whine of diesel generators guided me until I saw several concrete and wooden buildings, a 100-foot-high water tower, and a generator shed. Further up, a steel suspension bridge carried truck traffic across the river. The scene reminded me of places where I had served in Vietnam and Thailand.

At Saritsana, U.S. Army Special Forces train Thai soldiers for combat in neighboring Laos. Since the early '60s, CIA-financed Meo mercenary armies, led by their most powerful chieftain Vang Pao, have been fighting in Laos, and estimates of the number of Meo men killed run as high as 50 per cent. To replace these losses, the United

States has been training Thais for the last three years. But the training and the fact that Thailand has been sending troops to Laos have not been acknowledged by U.S. or Thai officials.

Senate Report

But a U.S. Senate subcommittee on security agreements and commitments abroad reported last year:

"The Thai irregular program... was designed by the CIA specifically along the lines of the irregular program in Laos. The CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

These Northern Thai

trance road. Elsewhere on the grounds were a Thai special forces headquarters, a jump tower and cable rig for parachute training, a drying loft for the parachutes, and several maintenance buildings.

'Air America' Sign

After checking with the Thai sergeant major, the guard took me across the runway to a building marked "Air America," the name of the charter line which flies secret missions for the CIA throughout Asia. My Thai escort ushered me into a U.S. Special Forces team room, where five men were having their morning beer. All wore civilian clothes or jungle fatigues without insignia or name

tags, a frequent tip-off that people are engaged in activity which might not square with formal pronouncements of U.S. policy.

At the camp, I was stopped at the main gate by three Thai guards, who called their commanding officer, a Thai special forces sergeant major, on the phone. When I told him I had once served with the U.S. Special Forces in Thailand and just wanted to talk with some Americans on the base, he said, "Sure, come on." One of the guards got on the back of my motorcycle and we drove to headquarters.

The 50-acre site is divided roughly in the middle by an airstrip. Heavy woods surround the base. Ten barracks for Thai soldiers were on the left side of the en-

tag, a frequent tip-off that people are engaged in activity which might not square with formal pronouncements of U.S. policy. Scattered among the usual pin-ups and memorabilia of home were other signs. One said: "No war was ever won with moderation and civility. KILL!" Another said: "Make war, not peace. War is the final answer."

The men were polite, almost painfully so. They did not mention their mission, and when I expressed interest they changed the subject.

Finally one of the men offered to escort me to the gate, and I followed his truck out and waved to the Thai guards as I left.

DATE 16 Jul 72

PAGE 1

U.S. Said to Break All of Soviet's Codes

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 15—The United States is reported to have refined its electronics intelligence techniques to the point where it can break Soviet codes, listen to and understand Soviet communications and coding systems and keep track of virtually every Soviet jet plane or missile-carrying submarine around the world.

"We're able to break every code they've got," a former analyst in the National Security Agency, one of the most secret of the Government's many intelligence agencies, is quoted as saying in the August issue of Ramparts magazine, which is published by Noah's

Ark, Inc., 2054 University Avenue, Berkeley, Calif.

The former analyst, whose name was not given in the article, was an Air Force staff sergeant who was discharged from military service in 1969 after three years of overseas duty as a communications traffic analyst for the agency in Turkey, West Germany and Indochina. He uses the pseudonym of Winslow Peck in the article.

Some Corroboration Found

Mr. Peck, who is 25 years old, was recently interviewed by a correspondent of The New York Times in California. Extensive independent checking in Washington with sources in and out of the Government who were familiar with intelligence matters has resulted in the cor-

roboration of many of his revelations. But experts strongly denied that the United States had broken the sophisticated codes of the Soviet Union or of other foreign powers.

The national security agency headquarters is at Fort Meade, near Baltimore. It has nearly 100,000 employees — most of them military personnel — and spends slightly less than \$1-billion a year. Unlike the Central Intelligence Agency, the N.S.A.'s primary purpose is the collection of information — most of it through advanced technology — but it rarely, if ever, tries to evaluate the importance of the information or analyze it.

The Ramparts article says that

Continued on Page 3, Column 1

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

the United States has encircled the Communist world with at least 2,000 electronic listening posts on land or on naval vessels or aircraft.

United States electronically equipped aircraft, according to the article, are constantly penetrating the air space of the Soviet Union, China and other Communist countries to provoke and record their radar and signal techniques to develop countermeasures against them.

This claim has been challenged here by independent Government intelligence experts, who said that there have been no authorized, as distinct from inadvertent, violation of Soviet or Chinese airspace by the United States since the U-2 flights of the early nineteen-sixties. The experts said that satellite photography has replaced aerial overflights, conceding, however, that United States electronic intelligence planes often fly along Communist borders to provoke reaction and collect signals.

In the California interview, which was recorded on tape, Mr. Peck described his early life in Joplin, Mo., his enlistment in the Air Force in 1966 when he was 20 years old, his subsequent recruitment by the security agent, his specialized training, his promotions and his three years of duty overseas. He was discharged in California in November, 1969, and says he turned down a \$10,000-a-year job offer by the Central Intelligence Agency. He decided instead, he says, to work to end the Vietnam war.

Tells of TV Monitoring

A highlight of Mr. Peck's disclosures include a report that in 1967 during his duty in Turkey the agency monitored a live Soviet television contact between Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, who was in tears bidding an emotional farewell to the astronauts Vladimir M. Komarov.

Mr. Komarov was then in orbit in the spacecraft Soyuz I, which was still two hours from re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. According to Mr. Peck's account the astronaut had just been informed by Soviet ground control that he



bring his spacecraft safely to earth were malfunctioning and that there was no hope of saving him.

Soyuz 1 crashed on Soviet territory on April 25, 1967, and Mr. Komarov was killed. He was posthumously granted a second Order of Hero of the Soviet Union and is buried in the Kremlin walls.

Mr. Peck also said that during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the United States electronic intelligence ship, the Liberty, was ordered near the Israeli coast to intercept details of Israeli military intentions.

The ship was attacked on June 8, 1967, by Israeli jet aircraft and torpedo boats—an incident that cost 34 United States dead and 75 wounded and which President Lyndon B. Johnson later described in his book, "The Vantage of Pint," as a "heart-breaking episode." Before the attack, he said, the Liberty learned that General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defense Minister, intended to order his forces on to Damascus and Cairo.

Tells of Johnson Pressure

Mr. Peck stated that President Johnson then brought intense pressure on Israel to halt further troop movement and warned Premier Kosygin on the "hot line" against what appeared to be an imminent Soviet airborne operation from bases in Bulgaria against Israel.

Intelligence sources here said they were unable to recall these details but a veteran of 30 years service in intelligence said of Mr. Peck: "He's obviously familiar with N.S.A.—its organization, operations and many of its techniques. But no sergeant in his early twenties would know how intelligence is handled at the White House level, what N.S.A. material is used or discarded

by the President or more than just the fringes about C.I.A. operations."

During his year of duty in Vietnam, from November, 1968, to October, 1969, Mr. Peck said, he participated in airborne electronic sweeps in Thailand in support of C.I.A. operations. The C.I.A., he said, was using unmarked attack bombers flown by C.I.A. "spookies" and based at Udorn to punish Meo tribesmen who had clashed with Thai Government troops over control of their traditional areas.

The United States depended on a friendly Thai Government for important air bases and other facilities useful for the Vietnam war, Mr. Peck noted, and thus was prepared to assign the C.I.A. surreptitiously to help the Thai Government suppress internal disorders.

Neither the N.S.A. nor the C.I.A. would comment today. Senior Government intelligence officials who were shown transcripts of the Peck interview discounted parts of it but corroborated others.

David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers," (published by Macmillan in 1967) and a leading authority on cryptanalysis, said in a telephone interview that the Ramparts article "represents much new information that rings true to me and seems correct." However, he challenged some points, specifically Mr. Peck's assertion that the agency's experts are able to "break every Soviet code with remarkable success."

Top-grade Soviet Foreign Ministry code systems "have been unbreakable since the nineteen thirties," Mr. Kahn said. He added that it was "highly unlikely that they have switched to breakable codes."

Mr. Peck's contention that "information gathered by N.S.A. is complete" implies a false importance, Mr. Kahn said. The N.S.A. does, he said, "solve many nations' diplomatic codes; but these are countries of the third rank and provide only indirect clues to Communist intentions."

Mr. Kahn noted that "what we are doing in this field the Russians are doing and, contrary to he Ramparts statement, they are very good."

He pointed out finally that the "thrust of the article, that the N.S.A. threatens peace, is incorrect."

"I believe that in the existing

world of two armed camps," Mr. Kahn said, "N.S.A. can provide more light, more truth—and this can lead to better evaluation of situations and so to more realistic responses. N.S.A. is not like the C.I.A., which can foment revolutions and can indeed threaten peace."

The interview contains a lengthy question-and-answer passage that Mr. Peck conceded, in his interview with The Times, was hurriedly prepared at a time when he was "extremely rattled."

Details of hitherto suspected but obscure details of electronic eavesdropping around the globe resulted, he said, from opposition to the Vietnam War and from a hope that others doing similar clandestine Government work would "come forward and say what they know." He concedes that his disclosures about the agency may involve him in legal tangles.

"I know the FBI knows who I am," he said recently. "I'd like to avoid publicity but I'm willing to go through trial and, if I have to, I'll go to jail. I don't like the idea of going to jail. It scares me. But I no longer feel the oath that I made when I was released from duty to never say anything about what I did is binding on me."

No Comment From Admiral

Senior agency officials, including Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, the director, are reportedly highly disturbed by Mr. Peck's interview. The agency is part of the Defense Department. Admiral Gayler, who has been named commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet after three years as director of the agency, is to be succeeded in a month by Lieut. Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, an Air Force space specialist. Direction of the agency is normally rotated among the three armed services.

Neither Admiral Gayler nor Defense Department officials could be induced to comment for publication. However, other intelligence sources agreed that the Ramparts material contained nothing that would endanger national — or cryptographic—security.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, June 8, 1972

G7

Nixon: Brezhnev Can Be Trusted

By Jack Anderson

No transcript was kept of the face-to-face meetings between President Nixon and Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev in the Kremlin.

As an act of trust, the President didn't even bring his own interpreter into the conference room but accepted Brezhnev's linguist.

After each session, Mr. Nixon methodically transcribed his recollections of the discussion. His personal notes constitute the only U.S. record of the historic Nixon-Brezhnev talks.

From a source with access to these notes, here are some of the highlights:

On the eve of the Moscow meeting, the strategic arms limitation talks were still snagged in Helsinki over Soviet unwillingness to halt construction of missile-carrying submarines. But the President, alone with Brezhnev, leaned forward and said: "Dammit, let's settle it."

Then they hammered out the important agreement to limit nuclear weapons. At one point, Mr. Nixon jokingly suggested that Russia could substitute its mammoth SS-9 missiles for submarines, since the new monster missiles resemble submarines in both size and shape.

"How do you know?" demanded Brezhnev gruffly. For "Russia has tried to keep its secrets from the world."

The President replied that they may as well be frank with one another about weapons, since both sides had excellent intelligence. Perhaps he said, the Soviets might wish to mount SS-9s on their submarines.

"This would sink the submarines," snorted Brezhnev.

"That is exactly what I had in mind," cracked Mr. Nixon.

The President found Brezhnev to be a hearty host but a hard negotiator. In the end, however, Mr. Nixon concluded that "the man can be trusted."

Peace Code

Perhaps even more important than the nuclear arms agreement, in the President's opinion, was a 12-point pact "to remove the threat of war" and "to promote reduction of tensions in the world." He felt this codified the new Soviet-American relationship and established the rules for avoiding future military confrontations.

The pact was proposed by the Russians and resisted at first by Mr. Nixon. He changed his mind, however, and decided it could be an instrument for peace. He personally drafted the 12 points between sessions in Moscow, and Brezhnev accepted most of the President's language.

Mr. Nixon drove himself relentlessly in Moscow, averaging only three to five hours of sleep the first six nights, as he

followed the endless hours of bargaining with meticulous notetaking and painstaking preparations for the next session.

He was buoyed by his success and left Moscow exhausted but exhilarated. He told aides jubilantly that he felt more confident than ever of an enduring peace. The Moscow meeting, he genuinely felt, had made the world a safer place.

During a subsequent visit to a Leningrad castle, the guide showed the President some trick mirrors and a spot where the acoustics made a few hand pats sound like great applause. Mr. Nixon gleefully made funny faces at himself in the mirrors, then he announced: "I am going to applaud myself."

He patted his hands and beamed happily when the magnified applause roared back.

Footnote: Even Andrei Grechko, the dour Soviet defense minister who reportedly had opposed the Nixon visit, warmed up to the President. While Mr. Nixon was standing at attention for the Soviet honor guard, he felt a tap on his shoulder. It was Grechko, who made a good-humored crack about the marching soldiers.

WASHINGTON WHIRL
Chaotic Society—President Nixon has told subordinates

that he still believes in fiscal responsibility and will return to a tight budget immediately after the election. He will begin, he suggested, by cutting ex-President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs. Mr. Nixon has already drafted a list of 110 federal programs that he believes should be repealed or, at least, turned over to local governments. He will charge that the programs were hastily conceived and poorly administered. He also intends to warn, in effect, that the Great Society will wind up instead as a Chaotic Society, with the workers taxed beyond endurance.

Headlines and Footnotes—

President Nixon's fund raisers have drafted a blacklist whose campaign contributions will be turned down. The list includes shady operators and former donors who demanded too much for their money... The President's foreign policy czar, Henry Kissinger, is quietly promoting New York's Gov. Nelson Rockefeller for Secretary of State... Admiral Hyman Rickover, the crusty father of the nuclear submarine, has never given a hang for naval starch and dress. The other day, he wore civilian clothes ventilated by a gaping tear in his pants.

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, May 19, 1972

B23

U.S. Moves May Reunite Russia, China

By Jack Anderson

There is evidence in the secret U.S. cable traffic that President Nixon's military moves in Vietnam may be driving the two great Communist antagonists, Russia and China, back together.

We have been able to trace the dismaying developments through secret documents, which the White House has carefully withheld from both Congress and the public.

These documents show that the Kremlin reacted to the Chinese-American rapprochement by making its own secret overtures to Peking last August. The Soviets worked through Lin Piao, the acerbic defense minister, who has been designated by Mao Tse-tung to become his successor.

Encouraged by his Soviet contacts, Lin opposed inviting President Nixon to Peking and advocated restoring the Chinese-Russian partnership. This put Lin in direct conflict with Premier Chou En-lai, who had issued the invitation to Nixon.

Lin lost the showdown and mysteriously disappeared. The crafty Chou spread the word to the party faithful that Lin had died in a plane crash after attempting to assassinate Mao.

Chou's version, which was whispered around China and reached CIA ears, had it that Lin attempted to waylay Mao on the way home from South China by train last August.

Knowing Mao's itinerary would take him through Shanghai and Wuhsi, Lin allegedly arranged an assassination party in Shanghai and afterward planned to blow up a bridge in Wuhsi to wreck Mao's train. Both plots failed, according to the story, and Lin attempted to flee to Russia by jet on Sept. 13. The plane supposedly crashed in the Wenteukhan area of Mongolia.

The whispers of the plot to kill Mao, who has deity status in China, apparently was intended to cow Lin Piao's supporters. So monstrous was the thought of assassinating the great Mao, in Chinese minds, that the Lin faction was supposed to be intimidated into silence.

But the opposition to Chou continued to simmer under the surface, and the Russians quietly pressed for better relations. The plenum of the Soviet Central Committee, in an unpublished action last November, sought to restrain the ideological struggle against the Chinese.

Still, other events inflamed Chinese-Russian relations until the State Department reported in a confidential summary last December: "Sino-Soviet international polemics as distinct from domestic propaganda have risen to the highest level since 1969."

Peking, however, has so far avoided whipping up a war scare within China, and it appears to be attempt-

ing to restrict increased tension with Moscow to verbal fireworks on international questions."

Significantly, Chou is in charge of China's international affairs and, therefore, was responsible for the rising rhetoric. President Nixon's air attacks upon North Vietnam, however, have made it awkward for Chou.

China and Russia have been competing for Hanoi's favor, as the two titans of communism maneuver for influence in Southeast Asia.

Rivalry in Hanoi

The Central Intelligence Agency, in a secret report, has declared: "Following Dr. Henry Kissinger's July visit to Peking, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai made a secret visit to Hanoi to reassure the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) of continued Chinese support."

"The Chinese emphasized their support by increasing their assistance to the DRV for the 1971-72 period. This in turn resulted in an increase in Soviet assistance to the DRV for the same period. . . .

"The DRV expressed its apprehension to Chou regarding a U.S.-Chinese detente and stated that the DRV is still suspicious about President Nixon's visit to Peking."

In view of the Chinese-Russian rivalry in Hanoi, Nixon undermined Chou and justi-

fied Lin's position by ordering air strikes against North Vietnam. This has strengthened Lin's survivors inside the Chinese policy councils.

As a result, Lin's idea of repairing Chinese-Russian relations is gaining support. At the United Nations, for example, the relations between Chinese and Russian delegates are warming.

A Soviet delegation, on tour of China, has also been received with unaccustomed cordiality. In return, there was no Soviet denunciation of the Chinese at the Lenin Day celebration on April 21.

There are now hints of Chinese-Russian cooperation to route war supplies overland to North Vietnam. If this develops, the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors will cost the U.S. far more in world strategy than is likely to be gained on the Vietnamese fighting fronts.

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020019-3
 THE WASHINGTON POST

DATE 15 May 72 PAGE D15

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, May 15, 1972 D15

Red Carpet for Nixon Slightly Pale

By Jack Anderson

Secret intelligence reports declare that President Nixon's high-risk military moves in Vietnam have undermined those in both Moscow and Peking who want to ease tensions with the United States.

Although there had been no visible opposition to the President's trip to Peking and invitation to visit Moscow, the Central Intelligence Agency claims the detente was fiercely resisted inside the policy councils of both governments.

To protect our sources, we cannot quote directly from the CIA documents. The CIA maintains, however, that the decision to invite Nixon was by no means unanimous in Moscow or Peking.

Citing "reliable" sources, the CIA claims the Soviet military hierarchy has opposed doing business with Nixon. Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, apparently, has become the principal spokesman for this faction inside the Kremlin.

The Russian marshals, according to the CIA, are eager to share credit in Hanoi for the North Vietnamese suc-

cesses. For the military equipment, which has smashed the South Vietnamese defenses, was made in Russia.

The Soviets, in the bidding against the Chinese for influence in Hanoi, had offered the North Vietnamese a \$110 million military loan. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the North Vietnamese military genius, declined to spend it for tanks, heavy artillery and anti-aircraft missiles.

The Soviet military brass would like to see a setback for U.S. interests not only in Vietnam but the Middle East. The CIA warns that the Russians may counter U.S. moves in Vietnam with new initiatives in the Mediterranean.

The CIA offers fewer specifics about the opposition within the Chinese leadership to the Chinese-American detente. But bitter opposition, says the CIA, is simmering beneath the surface.

Laird's Good Humor

Our recent columns on the misuse of the Pentagon auto fleet has drawn a good-humored reaction from Defense Secretary Mel Laird and orders from on high to start obeying the regulations.

But the Pentagon bigshots, as usual, are reading the regulations to suit their expensive tastes, not to save the taxpayers' money. Result: most of the staggering waste continues.

We told, for example, how Pentagon cars, intended for use only on pressing official business, had become a luxury limousine service for military potentates and their congressional friends.

Laird, meanwhile, still has two limousines at his constant call in case one should develop motor trouble. His special assistant, Carl Wallace, is also picked up each morning and delivered home each evening by a military chauffeur.

The men who toil in the Pentagon garage, however, were getting the word to put an end to excursions that violate regulations. This, presumably, meant stopping the practice of routinely chauffeuring members of Congress around Washington.

But when the motor pool tried to follow orders, it found itself in hot water with the Pentagon's congressional liaison office, which is responsible for keeping the military's

popularity rating high on Capitol Hill.

The clash between military regulations and congressional relations was quickly resolved in favor of keeping the Congressmen happy. The soldiers who man the motor pool were ordered to provide whatever the congressional liaison office wanted.

So military vehicles continue, for example, to bring in large quantities of liquor from the Pentagon's Washington supplier so there will be plenty to serve to thirsty Congressmen when they attend a military reception or take a military flight.

The fact that such trips involve an apparently illegal transportation of liquor across the Virginia border from Washington doesn't bother the Pentagon brass.

Apparently, the abuse of military cars is not confined to Washington. At the U.S. naval base in Bermuda, for example, the brass ride around in full-size American sedans despite the fact that such large cars are legally forbidden to other residents of the resort island.

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, May 10, 1972 B 15

'Brainwash' Attempt by Russians?

By Jack Anderson

Hidden in the Central Intelligence Agency's most secret files is an account of a possible Soviet attempt to "brainwash" our embassy personnel in Moscow with mysterious microwaves.

The fantastic details are contained in a file marked "Operation Pandora," which describes how the Russians bombarded our embassy with eerie, low-radiation impulses. Their secret intent, it was suspected, may have been to alter the personalities of our diplomats.

The bizarre story began in 1945 when a Russian presented Averell Harriman, then our ambassador, with a handsome carved Great Seal of the United States. Harriman proudly hung it in the embassy.

The seal contained a tiny electronic eavesdropping device, which monitored conversations inside the embassy until 1952, when it was detected. From this shocking discovery came urgent orders that all embassies must be periodically checked for electronic signals.

In the '60, U.S. security men discovered the strange microwave impulses, some steady, some pulsating, directed into our Moscow embassy from a neighboring building.

The CIA quickly learned that Russian medical literature suggested microwaves can cause nervous tension, ir-

ritability, even disorders. They speculated that the Russians were trying to drive American diplomats stir crazy with the waves.

Neither the CIA nor the State Department had the facilities to test the effects of the silent rays on human beings. At the Pentagon, however, the super-secret Advanced Research Project had worked on electronic sensors and other weird projects.

The agency quietly began a study, under the direction of Richard Cesaro, into the effects of microwaves on people. Cesaro gave the project the code name, "Operation Pandora," and called in a physician, Dr. Herb Pollack, and two crack military scientists, Dr. Joseph Sharp of Walter Reed Army hospital, and engineer-microwave expert Mark Grove of the Air Force.

Sharp and Grove, supplied with the microwave data monitored in the embassy, duplicated the embassy environment, using monkeys for diplomats.

The monkeys actually were trained to perform tasks and then were rewarded with food, much as embassy employees might be rewarded with a dry martini at the end of the day.

The monkeys were studied night and day for months at Walter Reed, while a collateral experiment was conducted on rabbits by consultant Dr. Milton Zaret in his own laboratory.

In the embassy in Moscow, meanwhile, no one except the highest diplomats and security men were aware of the secret microwave drama.

By 1967, the scientists felt they had watched the monkeys long enough for a tentative reading. Some felt there were signs of "aberrant behavior" caused by the microwaves, but the majority disagreed. Only the rabbits showed clear changes—in their heart rate—which Zaret attributed to heat from the rays.

The disagreement on psychological changes were sent to a top secret reviewing board, which also could reach no absolute conclusion that the rays affected the monkeys' minds.

Nevertheless, the suspicion lingered, and the White House decided that even if the microwaves were not "brainwashing" embassy people, they should be halted. It was also suspected that the waves might be part of some radical new surveillance technique.

At the June 1967 Glassboro meeting between President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin, the question of the microwave rays came up. One informant insists Johnson personally asked Kosygin to end the ray bombardment, although other sources say the request was made at a lower level.

By 1968, most of Cesaro's scientists were convinced that the microwaves were not psychologically harmful and the

embassy experiments ended in early 1969.

The brilliant work done by the team, however, has now led to important research on the effects of microwaves. So far, tests show high radiation can injure eyes, genital organs and perhaps other parts of the body. But, as yet, there is no conclusive proof that low-level radiation is harmful.

Footnote: We have spoken with Cesaro, Pollack, Sharp, Zaret and Grove. All acknowledged they worked on "Operation Pandora," but all refuse to go into details. As Sharp put it: "Pandora was classified in those days and still is."

Auto Pollution

The Environmental Protection Agency has eased up on the car makers, all very secretly, so they can spew more exhaust into the atmosphere than federal law allows.

The Clean Air Act requires a reduction of at least 90 percent in poisonous exhaust emissions by 1975. But it has been left up to EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus to implement the law.

Ruckelshaus's first proposal was so weak that Ralph Nader and other environmentalists raised an almighty howl. On the other side, the auto makers, led by General Motors, claimed it was too tough.

Publicly, EPA defended the proposal, but behind closed doors, the agency caved in to General Motors.

D15

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Monday, May 8, 1972

D15

U.S. Beats Russia in Capsule Chase

By Jack Anderson

With all the drama of a TV thriller, an American helicopter and Soviet trawler raced at top speed recently for a missile capsule that had plopped into the stormy Atlantic.

The dramatic dash took place on March 18 off the Virginia coast. In a hairbreadth finish, the copter triumphantly retrieved the capsule from the ocean a couple of minutes before the trawler reached the spot.

The missile was fired on March 17 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration from Wallops Island, Va. This was a classified mission for the Atomic Energy Commission to measure how cloud moisture erodes projectiles, including America's nuclear missiles.

The small, cloud-probing missile soared into the atmosphere, then jettisoned its capsule about 20 miles offshore into turbulent international waters. The capsule contained

secret instruments and a homing beacon. But recovery from the high waves was impossible.

Next day, the waves had calmed, but the beacon was dead. For half a day, NASA planes searched for the bobbing object. Finally, a fixed-wing scouting plane spotted the capsule and hovered protectively over it.

Rushing toward the capsule, however, was a Soviet fishing boat. The Soviets have outfitted many of these ships with the latest electronic monitoring equipment. The boats fish for sea herring, mackerel and U.S. secrets along the American coast.

At the approach of the trawler, NASA hastily ordered a rescue helicopter into the race. The clattering copter and the straining trawler almost converged on the prize at the same time. But the copter reached the capsule ahead of the boat and dropped down in the waves, while the American crew expertly fished the capsule from the seas in the nick of time.

At Wallops Island, a NASA spokesman confirmed our ac-

count of the sea chase. The trawler may have been monitoring the homing device, or the Russians may have been attracted to the spot by the hovering U.S. plane. But the spokesman acknowledged "our guys were uneasy."

For the Russians to have filched the capsule with its cargo of American secrets from under NASA's nose, he conceded, would have been highly embarrassing. "But," he said, "there's nothing we could have done. Those were international waters."

Nixon Document

The mystery of billionaire Howard Hughes' \$205,000 loan to President Nixon's brother, Don, still has some loose ends that need tying up.

When this column exposed the loan 12 years ago, Richard Nixon stated: "I had no part or interest in my brother's business. I had no part whatever in the negotiation of this loan."

From the records of the Los Angeles County Courthouse, however, we have obtained a 16-year-old document which seems to dispute Mr. Nixon's

statement. This is a lease of the bit of land owned by Mr. Nixon's mother, Hannah, which was used to secure the Hughes loan. The lease was made out to Union Oil Company of California and is part of the complicated loan arrangements.

It is signed by Hannah Nixon, and the faded stamp shows it was notarized by William A. Ridgely in Washington, D.C. At that time, Ridgely worked in the Senate financial office, as he still does.

Only a senator or the president of the Senate could have approved Hannah Nixon's use of Ridgely's office for notarizing. As Vice President, Mr. Nixon was then president of the Senate.

Ridgely told us he vaguely recalled going to Mr. Nixon's house to do notary work. "That could have been the time," he told us.

In any case, it appears that Mr. Nixon, or someone in his office, sent Hannah Nixon to Ridgely to get a lease notarized on Oct. 12, 1956—at the same time Mr. Nixon said he "had no part whatsoever in the negotiation of this loan."

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020019-3

THE WASHINGTON POST

DATE 11/11/01

C 39

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, April 14, 1972

C 39

Kremlin Financing Latin Revolution

By Jack Anderson

The Kremlin has asked Cuban dictator Fidel Castro "to try to regain control over Latin American revolutionary movements and has promised 'to pay all the cost involved'."

This is the secret finding of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has put together the pieces from its agents in Europe and South America.

In an earlier column, we reported that Castro had moved his Latin American Liberation center from his embassy in Paris to his embassy in Santiago, Chile. His ambition, according to the CIA, is to stir up "revolution everywhere in Latin America."

This clandestine operation, says the CIA, will be financed by the Soviets.

Citing information that came directly from Cuban intelligence officer Enrique Benavides Santos in Paris, the CIA reports:

"Benavides said that through Cuba the Soviets will support armed revolution or political struggle, whichever was deemed appropriate in given countries throughout Latin America."

"According to Benavides, the Soviets have told Cuba they will 'pay for everything' in helping all revolutionary groups, even Catholic radical groups."

Benavides strongly emphasized that Cuba has not

changed its line but still favors armed revolution everywhere in Latin America.

Soviet-Cuban Strategy

The new liberation center in Santiago, says the CIA, "will receive Soviet funds via Cuba and play a large role in the new Soviet-Cuban strategy for Latin America."

"Representatives of Latin American revolutionary groups now in Chile," the CIA adds, "are currently preparing a campaign of increased revolutionary activity with the support of Cuba."

At least one revolutionary group, according to another CIA report is receiving funds directly from the Soviet Union. A source inside the Guatemalan communist movement told the CIA that "the Soviets were giving \$100,000 per year to the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT)."

From a member of the Cuban delegation at the United Nations, meanwhile, the CIA learned that at least some Cuban leaders "are doing some re-thinking on basic revolutionary tactics."

"There is some theoretical opposition to the 'Che Guevara' theory, which favors supporting native insurrectionists and anarchists in poor countries."

"Instead, support is growing for the Chilean formula, which maintains that traditional democratic procedures are the best means of social;

list power in weak, backward countries.

"It is in countries like Brazil," the CIA quoted the Cuban delegate as saying, "that stronger active measures should be taken."

'No-Fault' Ruckus

When a self-styled consumers group in New York City tried to keep Sen. Frank Moss (D-Utah) from talking about "no-fault" insurance at their inaugural meeting Moss angrily canceled the speech.

The "consumers group" is made up of wives of members of the American Trial Lawyers Association. The association is busily lobbying against "no-fault" because it will reduce lawyers' fees by an estimated \$1 billion.

But the wives have agreed to back product safety bills which don't cut into their fur coats and their husbands' Cadillac. So they wanted Moss to speak.

The ladies' lawyer Herman Glaser called Moss' office to make the final arrangements and said a press conference would be held at the meeting. As Moss' secretary Dolly Plumb recalls it Glaser left instructions that if the press asked about "no-fault," Moss was to reply: "I have no comment to make on this point."

When the senator was told about this, he exploded. "Nobody tells me what I can answer and what I can't," he

roared. "Tell him I won't talk to them!"

Footnote: "No-fault" is scheduled for secret hearings in a few days before the Senate Commerce Committee.

Washington Whirl

WHALLEY FOOTDRAG—John Woodcock Jr., assistant district attorney of Blair County in Pennsylvania, has been stymied in his investigation of Rep. Irving Whalley's kickbacks by the House Clerk and the Justice Department. The clerk, Pat Jennings, has passed the buck to the do-nothing House Ethics Committee, and the Justice Department has dodged Woodcock's questions. Ironically, Woodcock and Whalley are both Republicans.

NAVY SECRETS—We have published classified information which we believe the public has the right to know. But we have been careful not to give away secret battle plans, weapons information, intelligence sources or other legitimate secrets. Four Navy officials, less careful, climbed into a taxicab the other day and immediately began discussing the top-secret performance of two Navy missiles. The cab driver, a former petty officer, has given us a detailed account of what they said. We checked with our Pentagon sources and learned the information should never have been mentioned outside security-proof rooms.

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

25X1A

Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020019-3

7

Walters Okayed For CIA Post

Army Maj. Gen. Vernon Anthony Walters, 55, was approved by the Senate yesterday as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a post which puts him in charge of most of the day-to-day workings of the agency.

CHILE'S CONGRESS SETS C.I.A. INQUIRY

I.T.T. Role Another Target
but Doubt Is Voiced

By JUAN de ONIS
Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, March 30 —The Chilean Congress has decided to investigate past activities of the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation reportedly aimed at keeping President Salvador Allende Gossens from taking office in 1970.

Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies called for the investigation after Hernán del Canto, Minister of the Interior, had reported on what he said was a plot by retired military officers and a small, right-wing opposition party to overthrow Dr. Allende last week.

The investigation will be conducted in the Chamber of Deputies. However, the anti-Marxist Opposition, which controls the Congress, questioned the evidence the Government has presented on both the C.I.A. activities and on the supposed plot.

The main opposition party, the Christian Democrats, announced that in protest it would organize a march open to "all democratic parties." The march, it said, would also serve to demonstrate opposition to the refusal by Dr. Allende's left-wing Government to authorize a march by women 10 days ago and another by private organizations Tuesday.

While Congress agreed to an investigation of the C.I.A. in Chile, a court of appeals released on \$82 bail the president of the Fatherland and Liberty movement, Pablo Rodríguez Grez, a lawyer who was accused by the Government prosecutor of fomenting the plot last week.

A retired general, Alberto Green Baquedano, and two retired junior army officers are being held in the plot, which the Government has said called for the assassination of Dr. Allende.

The investigation of the C.I.A. and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, which has large investments here, stems from purported I.T.T. documents made public by Jack Anderson, the syndicated Washington columnist.

The documents, which suggest that I.T.T. employees, some of whom were in contact with the C.I.A. in Washington, tried unsuccessfully to promote a military coup to keep Dr. Allende from taking office, have caused a political storm here.

Ex-C.I.A. Director Cited

John A. McCone, a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has confirmed that executives of International Telephone & Telegraph Corporation had discussed moves against President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile, the magazine Business Week said today.

Mr. McCone, now a member of the I.T.T. board of directors and its executive committee, was quoted as saying he had been consulted and that the company had told the United States Government that it had a plan to block the election of Dr. Allende "with help with it."

Far from disavowing the authenticity of the memorandum published by Mr. Anderson, Mr. McCone said they were written by I.T.T. staff members, according to Business Week.

I.T.T. spokesmen have denied as "without foundation in fact" allegations that the company had planned or participated in any plots against Dr. Allende in an effort to protect its properties in Chile against expropriation.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, March 30, 1972 K 11

CIA Papers Show Anti-Allende View

By Jack Anderson

In earlier columns, we quoted from internal memos to show how the International Telephone and Telegraph conglomerates and the Central Intelligence Agency plotted together unsuccessfully to block President Salvador Allende from coming to power in Chile.

We have now obtained secret CIA documents which explain why the CIA, at least, was anxious to prevent Allende's election. The cloak-and-dagger crowd feared he would permit the Communists to turn Chile into a base for stirring up revolution throughout South America.

The latest secret intelligence reports bear out the CIA's concern. These reports that Cuban dictator Fidel Castro has turned his embassy in Santiago, Chile, into "the principal Cuban center for support of Latin-American liberation movements."

This Cuban liberation center allegedly "provides financial and logistical support and guidance to the subversive groups operating in other Latin American countries."

The CIA also charges that, through lesser government officials, has apparently given his approval for Cuba to maintain contact with these subversive elements in Chile.

Castro has formed a special Directorate for Liberation whose mission is to foment Communist revolutions around the world. It is staffed, according to the CIA, by hundreds of tough, trained intelligence officers under the command of Manuel Pineiro Losado, who is known by the code name "Barba Roja."

The Latin American section is directed by a man known as "Ariel," whom the CIA identifies by two names he has used in the past, Juan Carretero Ibanez and Ruben Cabrera Marquez. From Havana, he directed the late Che Guevara's rag-tag guerrilla operations in Bolivia in 1968.

The chief of the liberation team in the Cuban embassy in Santiago, according to the CIA, is Manuel Martinez Galian, who goes by the code name "Manolo." He is a veteran Communist intelligence officer who is reportedly in charge of all clandestine activities in the Santiago embassy.

"The presence in Santiago of 'Manolo' and 'Ariel,'" declares a secret CIA report, "are indicators of the importance attached to the continued Cuban government interests and active support of the export of the revolution."

Castro used his embassy in Paris as "the principal center concerned with providing vari-

ous types of support to Latin American liberation movements" until Allende allowed him to open an embassy in Santiago. "Communications between the Cuban officers in Santiago and guerrillas operating in other countries," says the CIA, "is accomplished by radio."

"On occasions an officer will be dispatched from Havana to make contact with one or more of the guerrillas. Explosives in the form of plastics are carried in false bottoms of suitcases by the traveling officers."

Footnote: The Cuban embassy supports various subversive groups throughout Latin America, but the CIA identifies as "the most notable" the notorious Tupamaro terrorists who operate in Uruguay.

Spruce Goose Revisited

Billionaire Howard Hughes' vintage plywood flying boat, the "Spruce Goose" is about to lumber into the news again. A team of General Services Administration officials has secretly visited the hangared monster to try to figure out what to do with it.

Although GSA owns the eight-motored giant, renting it to Hughes for about \$800 a month, Hughes guards required the officials to sign in, then barred them from going

inside the plane. They were kept 20 feet away on the grounds that maintenance work was in progress.

Resigned to Hughes' strange ways, GSA regional head Richard Laws complied. Laws sighed, "It's a beautiful thing" when he saw the air relic which is bigger overall than either the 747 or huge C-5 transport.

GSA is considering giving the ivory-colored behemoth, which Hughes test flew one time only 25 years ago, to a federal, state or municipal museum. If none will take it, GSA may sell it for a novel restaurant, as a low-speed air transport, or as a tourist attraction such as the London Bridge or the Queen Mary.

Thus, the Hughes book hoax controversy is finally stirring the government to dispose of the venerable seaplane slumbering in its huge humidity-controlled hangar in California.

Gravel vs. Kleindienst

Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) has confided to friends that he will vote firmly against elevating Richard Kleindienst to Attorney General.

Gravel was dubious before the ITT hearings. Now, he says, he is convinced that Kleindienst is unsuitable as the nation's number one law enforcer.

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, March 30, 1972 K 11

CIA Papers Show Anti-Allende View

By Jack Anderson

In earlier columns, we quoted from internal memos to show how the International Telephone and Telegraph conglomerates and the Central Intelligence Agency plotted together unsuccessfully to block President Salvador Allende from coming to power in Chile.

We have now obtained secret CIA documents which explain why the CIA, at least, was anxious to prevent Allende's election. The cloak-and-dagger crowd feared he would permit the Communists to turn Chile into a base for stirring up revolution throughout South America.

The latest secret intelligence reports bear out the CIA's concern. These reports that Cuban dictator Fidel Castro has turned his embassy in Santiago, Chile, into "the principal Cuban center for support of Latin-American liberation movements."

This Cuban liberation center allegedly "provides financial and logistical support and guidance to the subversive groups operating in other Latin American countries."

The CIA also charges that, through lesser government officials, has apparently given his approval for Cuba to maintain contact with these subversive elements in Chile."

Castro has formed a special Directorate for Liberation whose mission is to foment Communist revolutions around the world. It is staffed, according to the CIA, by hundreds of tough, trained intelligence officers under the command of Manuel Pineiro Losado, who is known by the code name "Barba Roja."

The Latin American section is directed by a man known as "Ariel," whom the CIA identifies by two names he has used in the past, Juan Carretero Ibanez and Ruben Cabrera Marquez. From Havana, he directed the late Che Guevara's rag-tag guerrilla operations in Bolivia in 1968.

The chief of the liberation team in the Cuban embassy in Santiago, according to the CIA, is Manuel Martinez Galan, who goes by the code name "Manolo." He is a veteran Communist intelligence officer who is reportedly in charge of all clandestine activities in the Santiago embassy.

"The presence in Santiago of 'Manolo' and 'Ariel,'" declares a secret CIA report, "are indicators of the importance attached to the continued Cuban government interests and active support of the export of the revolution."

Castro used his embassy in Paris as "the principal center concerned with providing vari-

ous types of support to Latin American liberation movements" until Allende allowed him to open an embassy in Santiago. "Communications between the Cuban officers in Santiago and guerrillas operating in other countries," says the CIA, "is accomplished by radio."

"On occasions an officer will be dispatched from Havana to make contact with one or more of the guerrillas. Explosives in the form of plastics are carried in false bottoms of suitcases by the traveling officers."

Footnote: The Cuban embassy supports various subversive groups throughout Latin America, but the CIA identifies as "the most notable" the notorious Tupamaro terrorists who operate in Uruguay.

Spruce Goose Revisited

Billionaire Howard Hughes' vintage plywood flying boat, the "Spruce Goose" is about to lumber into the news again. A team of General Services Administration officials has secretly visited the hangared monster to try to figure out what to do with it.

Although GSA owns the eight-motored giant, renting it to Hughes for about \$800 a month, Hughes guards required the officials to sign in, then barred them from going

inside the plane. They were kept 20 feet away on the grounds that maintenance work was in progress.

Resigned to Hughes' strange ways, GSA regional head Richard Laws complied. Laws sighed, "It's a beautiful thing" when he saw the air relic which is bigger overall than either the 747 or huge C-5 transport.

GSA is considering giving the ivory-colored behemoth, which Hughes test flew one time only 25 years ago, to a federal, state or municipal museum. If none will take it, GSA may sell it for a novel restaurant, as a low-speed air transport, or as a tourist attraction such as the London Bridge or the Queen Mary.

Thus, the Hughes book hoax controversy is finally stirring the government to dispose of the venerable seaplane slumbering in its huge humidity-controlled hangar in California.

Gravel vs. Kleindienst

Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) has confided to friends that he will vote firmly against elevating Richard Kleindienst to Attorney General.

Gravel was dubious before the ITT hearings. Now, he says, he is convinced that Kleindienst is unsuitable as the nation's number one law enforcer.

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

THE WASHINGTON POST

DATE 138p72 PAGE 22Joseph Alsop

Political Hallucination

PLAIN, downright hallucination is the only word that describes the kind of unreality characterizing the election campaign to date. Sen. George McGovern says that the U.S. can get along very nicely without a serious national defense. President Nixon intimates that he has already brought peace in his time—or will soon do so.

Meanwhile, the central fact in the world political landscape is not the Vietnam war. It is not even the dangerous Middle Eastern situation, that produced the murders at the Olympic games and the subsequent Israeli reprisals. It is something infinitely worse, at least in its future potential.

It is in fact the never-ceasing Soviet military buildup on the frontier of Communist China. According to an accurate recent report, three new mechanized divisions have been added, this summer, to the Soviet forces now threatening China.

ANYWHERE in this town, you can get an argument about the resulting total of these Soviet forces. In the Pentagon, 49 divisions is a good average estimate. In the Central Intelligence Agency, certain analysts are deeply wedded to the old "liberalization" theory about the Soviet Union. These men have therefore been fighting a powerful rear-guard action against the facts, ever since the Soviet buildup began. Hence their figure is below 49 divisions.

Both in the CIA and in the Pentagon, there are also very able men who use figures well above 49 divisions. In addition, Soviet units not divisionally organized, Soviet border guards, and the puppet Mongolian divisions, all rather obviously need to be counted.

Furthermore, the Byzantine workings of the American "order of battle" system make it quite automatic that even the highest estimate tends to be an underestimate. Only two things are certain. The Soviet buildup is still in progress, growing more menacing with each passing month. And this buildup has now reached really vast proportions.

There are simple reasons,

too, why this mounting Soviet threat on China's frontier is really the central fact in the world political landscape. The purpose, quite obviously, is a preventive attack to destroy China's nuclear power, before China's nuclear power grows too great. The Soviet decision, whether "go" or "no go", must also be made not later than the end of 1974. After that, the snake will be too big to scotch.

THIS REPORTER has heard at least one U.S. government insider—a man of extreme ability—place the odds on a Soviet "go" decision at no less than 70-30. Most would put the odds much lower. Yet no one can deny, in the face of the facts about the Soviet buildup, that there is at least a material chance that the decision will be "go."

If that is the case, in turn, the whole world will be automatically plunged into something like a Hitler-time without an Adolf Hitler. An unprovoked Soviet attack on China must begin with a nuclear attack. Such a development will alter every calculation, including every calculation about Soviet behavior in other crucial areas, like the Middle East.

In sum, there is a great and desperate turning point ahead. One kind of turn will produce the results summarized in the preceding paragraph. The other kind of turn will lead to a wholly novel development of great power relationships, not without risk but at least rational. And this development will emphatically include the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Add, further, that the threat on China's frontier has been the single secret of President Nixon's diplomacy. Without that threat, he could never have been invited to Peking. Without the invitation to Peking, the Moscow meeting would also have been impossible, at least in the circumstances of that moment. Add, finally, that the primary long term aim of the President's entire diplomatic program is to pass the desperate turning point, now lying just ahead,

without Hitler-like consequences.

You can see, then, why the atmosphere of the presidential campaign can be, indeed must be called hallucinatory. A good deal of the blame belongs to the press. With a few honorable exceptions like William Beecher of The New York Times, the U.S. press now takes McGovern-like views on such matters. The central political fact in the world landscape is therefore too unpleasant to report or discuss.

In these circumstances, you cannot blame the candidates. But it is hard to be charitable about the liberal intellectual community, where the tendency to self-delusion ultimately originates.

© 1972, Los Angeles Times

See 40m 6
in June 1

The Washington Merry-Go-RoundTHE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Sept. 12, 1972 **B 15**

Sen. Nelson Probes Cold Remedies

By Jack Anderson

Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) is quietly investigating cough and cold remedies, which earn \$1 billion a year for their producers from the nation's sneezes, sniffles and wheezes.

He will concentrate on Al-lerest, Benzedrex inhalers, Contac, Coricidin D, Dristan, Novahistine, Sinutabs, Triaminicin, Vicks inhalers, Vicks Va-Tro-Nol and similar over-the-counter concoctions.

All of them contain substances which Nelson's staff has found to be dubious, if not dangerous. Their findings are based upon a study of medical literature.

Many of the capsules, sprays, pills, inhalers and drops featured in TV commercials, they have found, could be dangerous for those suffering from diabetes, heart trouble, high blood pressure and thyroid disease.

Even for people with the simple sniffles, too heavy a drug-store dosage may cause irregular heart beats, nervousness, skin eruptions and urinary problems.

Nelson is particularly critical of the cold cure industry's failure to provide adequate information to sufferers. The same TV commercial, which shows a husband happily awakening with cleared sin-

awakening at all if he were a heart patient.

While the commercial may advise that the medicine be taken "only as directed," there is seldom any specific warning what the drug may do besides temporarily drying up nasal passages.

Indeed, Nelson has found that there may be a "congestion rebound" from the anti-congestants, which leave the nose more stopped up than ever. If this is followed by indiscriminate use of nose drops and sprays to clear the nose again, the mucous tissues can be damaged so as to invite infections of the sinuses and middle ear.

The Federal Communications Commission, which could compel TV to give specific warnings on medicines, has left the cold commercials largely unregulated. Nelson plans to invite the FCC to explain its laxness on various drug commercials.

He expects to open the cold remedy hearings—with a flair for timing—at the beginning of the sniffles season in November or December. Government officials, doctors and scientists will be called to testify. The drug makers, of course, will be invited to respond.

Coded Messages

At the height of the Olympic drama, when the Black September terrorists were moving their Israeli hostages

to the Munich airport for the unexpected shoot-out, guerrilla radio transmitters in Syria broadcast a number of coded messages.

"From Samir to the eagle," began a typical message. "We await your gift. The sky is clear and the job well done."

There is other evidence that the terrorists may have received orders from a clandestine headquarters in Syria. However, the Syrian authorities, while paying lip service to the Palestinian cause, have kept tight control over guerrilla operations within their borders.

No Guarantee

The Central Intelligence Agency has reported from Damascus that the Syrian authorities reached an agreement with Yasser Arafat, leader of the largest Palestinian guerrilla organization, al Fatah, "to rein in the extremist organizations and not allow them either to cause any further troubles inside Syria or to cause trouble with Jordan."

The CIA, quoting the private remarks of Syrian Army Chief of Staff Mustafa Talas, added: "He could not guarantee 100 per cent that there would be no further provocations by the fedayeen against Jordan, as neither (Syria) nor Fatah had full control over the extremist elements in the radical fedayeen organizations, and an 'accident' spon-

sored by one of these organizations was always a possibility.

"He added, however, that Syria and Fatah were fully agreed on a policy of no further provocations against Jordan and that Arafat had promised to force the radical organizations in Syria into line."

It may be significant that the emphasis was on avoiding trouble with Syria's Arab neighbor Jordan, not on preventing provocative acts against Israel.

Talas was quoted by the CIA as saying: "We have had enough of Arabs shedding Arab blood. The enemy is Israel, and when the time for battle comes, then they can fight as much as they like against the Israelis."

The Syrian army chief recalled the military showdown between Jordan and the Palestinian guerrillas in September, 1970, which spawned the Black September movement. Jordan smashed the guerrillas and drove back Syrian tanks that had been sent to help the guerrillas.

"We fought the Jordanians in September, 1970," Talas is quoted by the CIA. "We lost some tanks and men; they lost some tanks and men; nobody won. And for what purpose? We were taken in by the fedayeen in 1970, but we are absolutely determined we will not allow such a thing to happen again."

© 1972, United Feature Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Sept. 11, 1973

B15

Terrorists Hope to Murder Hussein

By Jack Anderson

The Black September terrorists, who were behind the Olympic massacre, have marked Jordan's King Hussein as their No. 1 assassination target. They hope to kill him on one of his trips abroad.

They take their name from September, 1970, a black month on their calendar, when King Hussein's forces crushed the Palestinian guerrillas and drove them out of Jordan. They have sworn revenge.

The Central Intelligence Agency, indeed, has linked the Black September terrorists to al Fatah, the main Palestinian guerrilla organization. They reportedly belong to a secret assassination arm of Fatah's intelligence service.

Whether Fatah's leader, Yasser Arafat, controls the Black September group is disputed. He has disavowed any responsibility for the terrorists. But the CIA has received "reliable" information that Black September is merely a cover for Fatah's assassination arm.

The CIA got wind of the assassination plot against King Hussein from inside Fatah's intelligence service, which

goes by the name Jihaz al Rasd.

Warns a secret CIA report: "Fakhri al Amari, who is chief of the special services section of Rasd, which is responsible for assassinations, kidnappings, sabotage and other acts of terrorism, was still working on his plan to 'get' King Hussein of Jordan the next time the latter travels outside Jordan. . . .

"Part of the plan involves one al Husayni, who is a captain and a pilot for Royal Jordanian Airlines, who many times has piloted the King's plane when the King has traveled abroad.

"Husayni's role is to provide Rasd with intelligence on the exact flight data when the King next flies, including Amman take-off time and any planned stops enroute. This information is needed for a possible backup emergency attempt, if Rasd discovers that the primary plan has been leaked. Husayni is also to provide the King's estimated time of arrival at the destination and is to tell Rasd in advance whether Husayni will be flying on that particular out-of-country trip or not."

Because the King was ex-

pected to visit Paris, the plot on his life became known, at first, as the "Paris plan." The trip, however, never took place, and the terrorists are still waiting for their opportunity.

Terrorists dressed as Muslim or Christian priests also are reported to be stalking other Jordanian leaders. Declares the CIA:

"Fatah's assassination plans are aimed solely at Jordanian ministers, army officers and members of the Royal Hashemite family. It is planned to execute these individuals wherever they may be found abroad in Arab countries, Europe or America.

"For this purpose Fatah has accumulated a number of forged passports which will be used in appropriate countries, i.e., Syrian passports in Egypt, Egyptian or Kuwaiti passports in the Sudan and Gulf passports in Saudi Arabia.

"The plans include the adoption of Muslim or Christian priestly disguise to use when appropriate or necessary."

Some 200 trained terrorists, all Fatah members, are reported to belong to the Black September organization. They assassinated Jordan's Premier

Wasfi Tal in Cairo last November and, subsequently, made an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Jordan's ambassador to London, Zayed Rifai.

Black September terrorists also have claimed responsibility for sabotaging a West German plant that manufactured parts for the Israeli Air Force, blowing up the oil complex at Trieste, Italy, and murdering five Jordanians who allegedly had been spying on Palestinians in Europe.

The Black September group has also attempted to hijack several Jordanian airliners, once successfully. Last May, four Black September members—two men and two girls—hijacked a Sabena airliner to Tel Aviv. But Israeli security men killed the men and captured the girls.

Jordanian authorities have linked Egyptian intelligence with the Black September movement. Five days before the assassination of Wasfi Tal, a top Jordanian security official told the CIA, classified Black September documents "were delivered to Egyptian intelligence officer in Amman Muhammad Abd al Salam for safekeeping."

© 1973 United Feature Syndicate